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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (2000).
STATEMENT OF TTHE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEEW
1.

Are the Court's findings of Fact with Respect to Historical Existence and
use of the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road clearly erroneous? This issue
was raised and preserved below in Defendants written closing argument
and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Standard of Review: The question of whether the trial court's Finding of Fact
are clearly erroneous is reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g., State
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah
1992). "The clearly erroneous standard 'requires that if the findings . . . are against the
clear weight of the evidence, jf the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has Ibeen made, the findings will be set aside.'" State v. C.A.,
995 P.2d 17 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting In Re J.N., 960 P.2d 403, 407 (Utah App.
1998)). "In addition, a party (Challenging the court's findings must marshal the evidence
in support of those findings, qnd then show that the marshaled evidence is insufficient,
as a matter of law, to supportjthe findings." Id. (citing In re J.M.V., 958 P.2d 943, 947
(Utah App. 1998)).
2.

Is the trial court'[s finding that there was not a ten-year period of
uninterrupted u$e clearly erroneous? This issue was raised and
preserved below in Defendants written closing argument and proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

1

Standard of Review: The question of whether the trial court's Finding of Fact are
clearly erroneous is reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g., State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992). "The
clearly erroneous standard 'requires that if the findings . . . are against the clear weight of
the evidence, if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made, the findings will be set aside.'" State v. C.A., 995 P.2d 17 (Utah
App. 1998) (quoting In Re J.A/., 960 P.2d 403,407 (Utah App. 1998)). "In addition, a party
challenging the court's findings must marshal the evidence in support of those findings,
and then show that the marshaled evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support
the findings." Id. (citing In re J.M.V., 958 P.2d 943, 947 (Utah App. 1998)).
3.

Are the trial court's conclusions supported by the findings of fact and/or are
the conclusions correct? This issue was raised and preserved below in
Defendants written closing argument proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

Standard of Review: The question of whether a trial court's findings of fact are
sufficient to support its conclusions of law is reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991); Kunzlerv. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App.
1993); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d
1296, 1300 (Utah App. 1991).

Additionally, conclusions of law are reviewed for

correctness. Id.
4.

Did the trial court err in finding that there was not an uninterrupted ten year
period of use of the road bv the public prior to plaintiffs' permanent blocking

2

thereof? This is^ue was raised and preserved below in Defendants written
closing argument and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Standard of Review: The question of whether the trial court's Finding of Fact are
clearly erroneous is reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g., State v. Pens,
869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992). "The
clearly erroneous standard 'requires that if the findings . . . are against the clear weight of
the evidence, if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made, the findings will be set aside.'" State v. C.A, 995 P.2d 17 (Utah
App. 1998) (quoting In Re J.Ni 960 P.2d 403,407 (Utah App. 1998)). "In addition, a party
challenging the court's findings must marshal the evidence in support of those findings,
and then show that the marshaled evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support
the findings." Id. (citing In re J.M.V., 958 P.2d 943, 947 (Utah App. 1998)).
5.

Are the trial court's findings of fact sufficient to support its conclusion of law
sufficiently detai ed to support its ultimate decision that there was a legally
sufficient blocking of the road and that the road was not a public
thoroughfare? this was raised and preserved below in Defendants written
closing argument and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Standard of Review: The question of whether a trial court's findings of fact are
sufficient to support its conclusions of law is reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991); Kunzlerv. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App.
1993); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474,477 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d
1296, 1300 (Utah App. 1991).
correctness. Id.

Additionally, conclusions of law are reviewed for

6.

Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in concluding that there was not a
ten-year uninterrupted period of use of the road and that the road was
therefore not a public thoroughfare? This issue was raised and preserved
below in Defendants written closing argument and proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.

Standard of Review: This presents a question of law that should be reviewed for
correctness. See, e.g., State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. Gardner,
844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992).
7.

Did the trial court err by failing to consider all evidence pertaining to the
existence of a public thoroughfare including evidence prior, during and/or
after the warranty deeds were executed by defendant? This issue was
raised and preserved below in Defendants written closing argument and
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and objection to
Plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment.

Standard of Review: This presents a question of law that should be reviewed for
correctness. See, e.g., State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. Gardner,
844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992).
8.

Did the court err in concluding that the statute of limitations had not expired
and the court could rely upon the warranty deed to prevent defendant from
asserting the public thoroughfare doctrine? This issue was raised and
preserved below in Defendants written closing argument and proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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Standard of Review: jThis presents a question of law that should be reviewed for
correctness. See, e.g., Statety.Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. Gardner,
844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992)
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
There are no Constitutional Provisions for the State of Utah or the United States.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. 72-5-104 (1999)
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-12 (2000)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Defendant Pinel View Meadow Estates respectfully begs this Court's
indulgence in using this section to try and give this Court both a flavor as well as the nature
of this case. Defendant respectfully urges this Court to keep several important facts in
mind as it reviews this case. P ne View Meadow Estates is a subdivision developer of high
mountain property subdivided for the purpose of recreational living. Defendant developed
the property in several differen : plat phases, although some of the phases were intertwined
as the development proceeded. The plat upon which Plaintiff purchased two (2) lots
(hereinafter "the lots") is in a subdivision titled Strawberry Valley Subdivision. Strawberry
Valley is located adjacent to a second subdivision which was being developed
simultaneously with Strawberry Valley. This subdivision is identified as Ihe Ponderosa
Villa.

Plaintiff purchased the lots almost two (2) years after Defendant commenced

construction and development of both Subdivisions.
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In order to develop Ponderosa Villa, (the upper elevated subdivision), it was initially
necessary to grade a road from Strawberry Valley, (the lower elevated subdivision), to
Ponderosa Villa. The first constructed road, known as Valley View Drive and referred in
the case as the Wilhelm Road, is the bases of this dispute. The road commences from
Bonanza Circle and traverses up and across lots 38 and 39 of Strawberry Valley to
Ponderosa Villa.

A second road was constructed a short time later and was also

constructed at the time Plaintiff purchased lots 38 and 39.
Plaintiff purchased lots 38 and 39 in Strawberry Valley in early summer of 1968 and
made payments on the lots for several years prior to actually being issued warranty deeds,
and was well aware, at the time the deeds were issued, that people were utilizing Valley
View Drive/Wilhelm Road to access their properties in Ponderosa Villa or to access
adjacent forest land. Governmental agencies utilized Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on
a regular basis to service fire protection for neighboring areas and it was testified by many
that hunters, strangers, guests, sight-seers, and every form of public utilized Valley View
Drive/Wilhelm Road during the roads existence.
This is a case wherewith Plaintiff is attempting to close and blockade Valley View
Drive/Wilhelm Road which has been open and available for use by the public for over thirty
(30) years. Plaintiff's claim of right to close Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road is based upon
a Warranty Deed executed by Defendant Pine View Meadows Estates in the early 1970's
which failed to identify and describe the roadway easement. Plaintiff also claims a right
of closure because of three alleged brief and temporary road blocks in the years 1973,
1980 and 1986. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that when Garkane Power trenched an
underground power line across the road during the years of 1973-74, through use of an

6

independent contractor, Plaintiff may rely on the trench as an effective blockage of the
road; in 1980, Plaintiff alleges }hat he blocked the road for a weekend with the use of a car
parked horizontally across the) road; and in 1986 by felling a tree across the road which
was removed by unknown persons for firewood. Defendant asserts that the road has been
open to the public for over thirty years and should thus be deemed a public road.
Defendant asserts further that all three of the road blocks were insufficient based on the
nature of blocking and lack of (notice to the public.
Plaintiff initially instituted this action demanding actual damages, punitive damages,
attorney fees and closure of Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. The only matter before this
Court on appeal is the trial court's order that Plaintiff be permitted to close Valley View
Drive/Wilhelm Road. Defendant asserts that Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road has been
open to the public for more than thirty (30) years and that by virtue of Utah Code Ann. §752-104, (1953 as amended), Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road has been abandoned and
deemed a public road, and

Plaintiff has no authority to block or close Valley View

Drive/Wilhelm Road and prevent its use by the general public.
Course of the Proceedings
On or about June 25, 1997, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendants
alleging a breach of warranty! under the deed executed by Defendants to Plaintiffs and
requesting damages and judgment against Defendants. Defendants filed their Answer and
Counterclaim on or about August 6, 1997 alleging that no breach of the warranty deed
occurred and that Plaintiffs had knowledge of the disputed roadway and had agreed to
keep the same open to the pijblic.
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On or about March 24, 1998, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint to add an additional cause of action requesting closure of the roadway in
dispute. On or about May 28, 1998, said Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint was
granted by the Court. Plaintiffs' Amended their Complaint and Defendants answered the
same on or about April 29, 1998. On or about July 8, 1998, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment. Defendants filed a counter Motion for Summary Judgment on or
about July 28, 1998. On or about March 8, 1999, the Trial Court issued its Ruling on
Motions for Summary Judgment partly denying both Motions and permitting the matter to
proceed to trial. The Trial Court did find that all evidence regarding the existence of a
public roadway prior to the issuance of the Warranty Deeds was irrelevant and
inadmissable because no reference to any existing

roadway was contained in the

Warranty Deed issued by Defendants to Plaintiffs. As such, Defendants were precluded
from claiming the existence of a roadway predating the conveyance.
Defendants, who were represented by different counsel at the time, filed a Notice
of Appeal on or about March 30, 1999. On or about April 21,1999, Defendants filed their
Motion for Summary Disposition and Plaintiffs filed their counter Motion for Summary
Disposition on or about April 23, 1999. Then counsel for Defendants, Attorney Patrick H.
Fenton, withdrew from the action on or about May 21, 1999. On or about June 1, 1999,
the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and the appeal was
dismissed until a final judgment was entered. A Notice of Entry of Appearance as Counsel
was filed by the undersigned on or about August 11,1999 on behalf of Defendants. A trial
was held on February 24, 2000.
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On or about March 3, 2000, Plaintiffs filed their Proposed Memorandum Decision,
Findings of Fact and Conclusibns of Law and Proposed Decree. On or about March 8,
2000, Defendants filed their Objection thereto and requested a 10-Day Extension in which
to file their Proposed Memorandum Decision. The Extension was granted on or about
March 17,2000. Defendants submitted a Motion for Reconsideration on Court's Ruling on
Summary Judgment Motions along with their Closing Argument in Support of Motion for
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on or about March 27, 2000.

Defendants

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Proposed Decree
submitted their Proposed Fi
on or about April 5, 2000. Or^ or about April 10, 2000, Plaintiffs filed their Objection to
Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration on Ruling on Summary Judgment Motions. On
or about May 19, 2000 Plaintiffs submitted their Response to Defendants' Objection to
Findings of Fact and Conclusibns of Law and Notice to Submit to the Court.
The Court issued its Firhdings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on or about May 4,
2000, and issued a Decree anb Judgment on or about May 24, 2000, in favor of Plaintiffs
holding that an unplatted roadway of some degree did exist and ordered the same to be
closed at Plaintiffs' expense, and awarding Plaintiff costs only. On or about June 21,2000,
Defendants filed their Notice (if Appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts are set forth tp allow this Court to carefully review the issues in this case.
Footnotes, where necessary, (lelp aid the Court in examining the facts in proper context.
1.

Defendant Pine Meadows Estates, Inc. is a Utah corporation formed for the purpose
of developing a mountain estate subdivision which was accessible by an air strip
(R. 347: Pages 12, 13}

2.

Several different plats were filed with regard to several phases of the subdivision at
different times in the Kane County Recorder's Office (R. 347: Pages 109-111).

3.

Prior to filing a plat, Defendant plowed the roads in the subdivision and had the road
surveyed in order to draft the plats for future recording in the Kane County
Recorder's Office (R. 347: Page 110).

4.

In order for the plats to be approved, it was necessary for all roads to be inspected.
As such, construction on the roads commenced in 1966 (R. 347: Page 111).

5.

The Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was constructed in 1966. (R. 347: Page 116).

6.

The Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road followed an old Timber Road which was there
before the property was purchased. (R. 347: Pages117 -118, 155, 156, 177).

7.

Much of the development occurred within several future subdivisions at the same
time even though plats for those subdivision had not yet been formally recorded with
the Kane County Recorder's Office (R. 347: Page 112).

8.

The actual recording of Strawberry Valley plat occurred on May 10, 1968 and
Ponderosa Villa plat was recorded in 1969 (R. 347: Page 110).

9.

Plaintiff purchased two (2) lots, Lots 30 and 39, both located within Strawberry
Valley plat and issued checks for the same in 1968. (R. 347: Pages 27-28).

10.

At the time Plaintiff purchased the properties, a rough road had been graded in
across Lots 30 and 39, linking Strawberry Valley to Ponderosa Villa. The road is
identified as the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road (R. 347: Pages 112, 127).

11.

Plaintiff asserts that no road traversed the property, but only a four-wheel drive track
crossed Lot 38. (R. 347: Page 31).
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Bill Pringle testified ttjiat when Plaintiff purchased the lot, the Valley View
Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road. (R. 347: Page 178)
Wallace Hoist testified that when he purchased his lot,

the Valley View

Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road when he was first there. (R. 347: Page 213)
Harry Moyer testified that he purchased his lot in 1967, and constructed his cabin
in 1968 and that the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road in 1968.
(R. 347: Pages 233-35)
Wallace Hoist testified that he purchased a lot in 1968 and testified that he went
and looked at the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision and drove up the Valley View
Drive/Wilhelm Road. (JR. 347: Page 199).
Wallace Hoist testified that the only way he new how to get to Ponderosa Villa
Subdivision was on thq Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Page 201).
Wallace Hoist testified that he knew the road was there before he built his cabin
which was in 1969 or 1970 . (R. 347: Page 212)
In 1970, Plaintiff commenced construction of his cabin (R. 347: Page 33).
Plaintiff asserts that f i e first time he noticed Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road
through his property w$s on September 18, 1972 (R. 347: Page 35).
Between 1973 and 1 $79, Plaintiff admitted that, on occasion, they witnessed
strangers on Valley Vibw Drive/Wilhelm Road with Mr. Farney but that there was
not a significant amount of use on the road until 1979 (R. 347: Page 40).
In 1968 Milt Farney toik many people up the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road to
show them property in the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision. (R. 347: Page 119)
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22.

Milt Farney traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a daily basis between
the years 1967 through 1980. (R. 347: Page 126)

23.

Bill Pringle traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a daily basis,
sometimes hundreds of times each summer between 1968-1990 and the first time
Pringle ever had knowledge that the road was blocked was in the mid 1990's. (R.
347: Page 186).

24.

Ronald Lloyd Graham traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a regular
basis, almost daily basis, several times a day, and never saw the road blocked in
1973-74 or 1980 (R. 347: Page 219).

25.

Ronald Lloyd Graham traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a regular
basis, on weekends and vacation days, especially memorial day weekends, in 1986
and other years and he and never saw the road blocked. (R. 347: Page 221).

26.

Ronald Lloyd Graham testified that he saw strangers, hunters, snowmobilers, forest
service, pedestrians, and was able to use the road anytime he pleased. (R. 347:
Pages 222-224).

27.

Harry Moyer testified that he saw strangers, hunters, pedestrians, and recreational
vehicles use the road. (R. 347: Page 240).

28.

Bill Pringle traveled the road daily but only saw the road blocked while the power
line was being installed. He never saw the car block the driveway nor did he ever
see any logs block the driveway. (R. 347: Pages 189-191)

29.

The only blocking Bill Pringle or Wallace Hoist saw was in the 1990's. (R. 347:
Pages 189,204)
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30.

That since the creation bf the disputed road across Lots 38 and 39, the undisputed
testimony is that the road has been open to the general public for forestry and
public personnel, recreational, snowmobiling, recreational vehicles, hunting, ingress
and egress of property owners throughout various subdivisions, the water truck and
the general public. (R. 347: Pages 131 -133, 150,)

31.

That Warranty Deeds were issued by Pine Meadows Estates to Plaintiff James R.
Wilhelm on January 6th, |l 972 for Lot 39 and September 25th, 1975 for Lot 38 (R. 84,
85).

32.

Valley View DriveAA/ilhelm Road was temporarily blocked by a trench cut into the
road for the purpose of installing electrical power to Plaintiff's cabin as well as other
homeowners in the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision (R. 347: Page 50).

33.

Said trench was dug by {a private party to meet the requirements of GarKane Power
(R. 347: Page 78).

34.

The trench was approximately four (4) feet deep and eighteen (18) inches wide (R.
347: Page 82).

35.

The trench across the r]oad impeded traffic for approximately one week. (R. 347:
Page 127)

36.

On Memorial Day weekend of 1980, Plaintiff asserts that he blocked Valley View
DriveAA/ilhelm Road at b e top of Lot 38 with dead aspen trees (R. 347: Page 40,
49).

37.

Plaintiff did not block the bottom of Valley View DriveAA/ilhelm Road at that time as
he did not access his property (R. 347: Page 42).
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38.

Defendant asserts that when he returned in June of 1980, the logs had been cut up
and removed (R. 347: Page 49).

39.

In 1986, Plaintiff testified that he blocked Valley View DriveAA/ilhelm Road with a
1959 Oldsmobile (R. 347: Page 53).

40.

Valley View DriveAA/ilhelm Road was physically blocked again by Plaintiff in 1993
(R. 347: Page 56).

41.

In 1993, Plaintiff placed construction materials across Valley View DriveAA/ilhelm
Road (R. 347: Page 59).

42.

In 1996, Plaintiff was approached by Deputy Kitchen of the Kane County Sheriffs
Department and informed that he was blocking a public roadway (R. 347: Page 68).

43.

After refusing to remove the debris, Plaintiff was cited for blocking a public road (R.
347: Page 168).

44.

Kane County maintained all of the roads in the Strawberry Valley and Ponderosa
Villa Subdivisions (R. 347: Pages 121-122).

45.

Kane County maintained the Valley View DriveAA/ilhelm Road for several years prior
to the lawsuit. (R. 347: Pages 121-122).

46.

Kane County placed a yield sign on Valley View DriveAA/ilhelm Road at the top of
the hill. (R. 347: Page 123)

47.

Paul Fullmer was the fire chief of Cedar Mountain Fire District. (R. 347: Page 247)

48.

Paul Fullmer testified that as a person who is familiar with special maps, he could
locate the Valley View DriveAA/ilhelm Road on the 1960 map as a line road. (R.
347: Pages 250-252)
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49.

Paul Fullmer testified hb recalled using the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road in the
mid-1960's because of the post sale timber, and that he utilized it for fire fighting
and other forestry purposes such as tree planting, logging, etc. (R. 347: Pages 252253).

60.

Paul Fullmer testified that prior to 1967 Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was a well
traveled road, and that he personally drove it in 1966. (R. 347: Pages 254, 258)

51.

Paul Fullmer saw hunters use the road. (R. 347: Page 255)

52.

Paul Fullmer uses the road to get access to forest land. (R. 347: Page 255)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial court's findings of fact with respect to the historical existence and

use of the Valley View Drivfe/Wilhelm Road were clearly erroneous because of the
overwhelming evidence su pp|orted by a multitude of witnesses who testified that they
traveled the road on a daily ba^is during the periods which Plaintiff testified he was present
and blocked the road Furthermore Plaintiff testified that no road existed at the time he
initially purchased the property which was unequivocally contradicted not only by testimony
of numerous witnesses, but by several forest service aerial photographs which clearly
depict a road traversing lots 3», 39 and 40 both prior to and after Plaintiffs purchase of his
lots. The court also found in its Findings of Fact that the road existed prior to and after
Plaintiff purchased the property
POINT II
The trial Court'i Findings of Fact that there was not a ten-year period of
uninterrupted use is clearly erroneous in that first and foremost there is virtually no
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Findings of Fact with regard to this issue. It is a fundamentally factual necessity to
determine whether blockage of the road actually transpired and if so, whether the
attempted blocking was sufficient to give the world notice of Plaintiffs intent to retain
private dominion of the road. Furthermore, once a public road has been established for
the necessary period, any attempt to block the road thereafter by Plaintiff was futile and
wholly inadequate to effectively privatize the road. The only finding provided by the trial
court supporting its Conclusions of Law was in Paragraph 36 which simply states that
plaintiff undertook efforts to block access to the road with logs, vehicles, reliance upon
trenching undertaken by others, and personal notice. The trial court categorically failed to
define which, if any, of the blockages effectively obstructed use of the road, and if so when
and which blocking were productive. This information is necessary to determine if a thenyear period of uninterrupted use occurred.
POINT III
The trial court's conclusions of law are not generally supported by the Court's
own Findings of Fact. However, the real problem with several paragraphs in the conclusion
is that it wholly fails to address mandatory issues and those issues addressed are
incorrect as a matter of law. The conclusions sites a number of things which are irrelevant
to the fundamental issue of whether a public road had been established. The most
consequential question revolves around whether there was a ten-year (or more)
uninterrupted use of the road by the general public. This conclusion summarily states that
the road "is not" a public thoroughfare without and indicia of what does or does not
constitute a public thoroughfare.
POINT IV
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If only one of the Plaintiffs attempts to block the road are ineffective, then the public
utilized the road for a 10 year period. The fundamental statutory requirement to establish
a public road is that the public use be "continuous" for a period of not less than ten years.
Therefore the definition of"continuous use" is crucial in the determination of whether a
road was, is or has become a "bublic" road. The trial court's cursory treatment of this issue
in its findings of fact effectively eviscerate any rational conclusion of law and make it
impossible to develop a logical conclusion as to whether there was an uninterrupted ten
year period and whether a puplic road was established.
POINT V
The Court did not mak^ any specific findings with respect to any blockages of the
road and this is a critical mistake by the Court because the ineffective blockages support
the conclusion that Plaintiff effectively interrupted the statutory 10 year period of
continuous use, as a matter off law-this is the heart and soul of this case. The Court is
obligated to make clear and concise findings of fact to support its conclusions which it has

not.
POINT VI
The trial court incorrectly found that there was not a 10 year period of use which was
uninterrupted by Plaintiff's attempts to block the road. Plaintiffs attempt to block the road
through reliance on Garkane's installation of an underground power line is completely
groundless and not supported by law. The depositing of dead tree limbs and temporary
blocking of the road with a car js also inadequate and failed to give adequate notice to the
general public.
POINT VII
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The Trial Court must consider the entire history of the road in determining its
existence as a public right-of-way and not from the date the deed was executed. By failing
to consider the entire life of the road's existence, the court failed to properly apply the law
which, while sparse and only discussed in dicta, indicates that public easements which are
apparent and in their nature permanent and irremediable should be construed against the
person receiving a warranty deed, presumably based on public policy.
POINT VIII
Upon issuance of a Warranty Deed, the grantor agrees to warrant the property, but
as in any contractual obligation, the warranty is subject to the statute of limitations which
commenced when Plaintiff Wilhelm viewed the disturbance. While the conclusions are
unclear, it appears that the Court found that Defendant was bound by the Warranty Deed
and could not assert the public road doctrine. This ruling is illogical and incorrect because
the Statute of Limitations had run against Plaintiff.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ARE THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF
FACT WITH RESPECT TO THE HISTORICAL
EXISTENCE AND USE OF THE VALLEY VIEW
DRIVE/WILHELM
ROAD
CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS?
The question of whether the trial court's Finding of Fact are clearly erroneous is
reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g., State v. Pens, 869 P.2d 932, 935
(Utah 1994); State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992). "The clearly erroneous
standard 'requires that if the findings... are against the clear weight of the evidence, if the
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
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made, the findings will be set ajside.'" State v. C.A., 995 P.2d 17 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting
In Re J.N., 960 P.2d 403, 407 (Utah App. 1998)). "In addition, a party challenging the
court's findings must marshal the evidence
i
in support of those findings, and then show that
the marshaled evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the findings." Id.
(citing/nreJ.M.\/.,958P.2d ^43, 947 (Utah App. 1998)).
In the present case the Court made the following findings with respect to the
historical existence and use ol the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road:
8.

9.

14.

15.

Prior to recording any of the subdivision plats, and in the area
encompassed by the same, there were several old unimproved onevehicle-1w dth roads that had been used by loggers, hunters, ranchers,
forestry personnel and others. These old roads are barely visible on
aerial photography dating to the early 1960's and supplied to the
Court The roads consisted essentially of tire tracks left over a period
of time and appear not to follow a well-thought plan,
One of thb old roads crossed portions of Lots 38 and 39, purchased
by plaintiffs from defendant Pine Meadows, and also crossed a corner
of Lot 40.
At the time of the purchase, plaintiff James R. Wilhelm and the
defendant Pine Meadows, through its duly authorized agent Bill
Pringle, Walked over and inspected the two lots. Pringle was the
agent in the deal with plaintiffs. Pringle acted as the selling
selling acj
agent of Pine Meadows for some 100 lots between 1968 and 1990.
The evidence was inconclusive as to when the road across lots 38,39
and 40 was first graded. Plaintiffs remembered it was not graded at
the time 6f purchase. Pine Meadows' president said it was, but its
selling agent, Pringle, thought it may not have been. The initial
grading effort was much more narrow and conservative than later
occurred

17.

Plaintiffs Accessed their property from the platted road fronting the
same. They likely followed an old logger/hunter road (the Valley View
Drive/Wilnelm Road) to get to the cabin site, but it was necessary to
perform some earth work to access this old road from the platted road
which had been cut along the mountain slope.

33.

During thte 1970's and into the 1980's the amount of development in
the various subdivision plats in proximity to Lots 38 and 39 was
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limited, and accordingly the amount of vehicular traffic in the area was
likewise limited.
35.

During the 1970's and into the 1980's there was some use of the old
road across Lots 38,39 and 40 by others who had constructed cabins
in the general vicinity. This use, however, was both limited and
sporadic because there as simply not an extensive amount of
development on the mountain at that time.

37.

Plaintiffs' blocking efforts were not exhaustive but neither was the
amount of use. Moreover, the use appears essentially to have been
made by neighbors within the subdivisions developed by Pine
Meadows as opposed to members of the general public.
A. Evidence Supporting Findings

1.
2.
3.

Plaintiff asserts that no road traversed the property, but only a four-wheel drive track
crossed Lot 38. (R. 347: Page 31).
Bill Pringle testified that when Plaintiff purchased the lot, the Valley View
Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road. (R. 347: Page 178).
Plaintiff asserts that the first time he noticed Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road
through his property was on September 18, 1972. (R. 347: Page 35).
B. Evidence Contrary to Findings

1.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

The Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was constructed in 1966. (R. 347: Page 116).
The Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road followed an old Timber Road which was there
before the property was purchased by Defendants. (R. 347: Pages 117 -118; 155-.
156; 177).
At the time Plaintiff purchased the properties, a rough road had been graded in
across Lots 30 and 39, linking Strawberry Valley to Ponderosa Villa. The road is
identified as the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Pages 112, 127).
Plaintiff asserts that no road traversed the property, but only a four-wheel drive track
crossed Lot 38. (R. 347: Page 31).
Bill Pringle testified that when Plaintiff purchased the lot, the Valley View
Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road. (R. 347: Page 178)
Wallace Hoist testified that when he purchased his lot, the Valley View
Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road when he was first there. (R. 347: Page 213)
Harry Moyer testified that he purchased his lot in 1967, and constructed his cabin
in 1968 and that the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road in 1968.
(R. 347: Pages 233-35)
Wallace Hoist testified that he purchased a lot in 1968 and testified that he went
and looked at the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision and drove up the Valley View
Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Page 199).
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9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.
16.

17.

18.

19.

20.
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.

26.

27.

Wallace Hoist testified I that the only way he new how to get to Ponderosa Villa
Subdivision was on the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Page 201).
Wallace Hoist testified that he knew the road was there before he built his cabin
which was in 1969 or 1970. (R. 347: Page 212)
In 1970, Plaintiff commenced construction of his cabin. (R. 347: Page 33).
Plaintiff asserts that the first time he noticed Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road
through his property was on September 18, 1972. (R. 347: Page 35).
Between 1973 and 1979, Plaintiff admitted that, on occasion, they witnessed
strangers on Valley V ew Drive/Wilhelm Road with Mr. Farney but claimed that
there was not a significant amount of use on the road until 1979. (R. 347: Page 40).
In 1968, Milt Farney took numerous people up the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road
to show them property n the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision. (R. 347: Page 119)
Milt Farney traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a daily basis between
the years 1967 through 1980. (R. 347: Page 126)
Bill Pringle traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a daily basis,
sometimes hundreds of times each summer between 1968-1990 and the first time
Pringle ever had knowledge that the road was blocked was in the mid 1990's. (R.
347: Page 186).
Ronald Lloyd Graham traveled the Valtey View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a regular
basis, daily basis, and sometimes several times a day, and never saw the road
blocked in 1973-74 or' 980. (R. 347: Page 219).
Ronald Lloyd Graham graveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a regular
basis, on weekends andI vacation days, especially memorial day weekends, in 1986
and other years and heI and never saw the road blocked. (R. 347: Page 221).
Ronald Lloyd Graham testified that he saw strangers, hunters, snowmobilers, forest
service, pedestrians, and was able to use the road anytime he pleased. (R. 347:
Pages 222-224).
Harry Moyer testified that he saw strangers, hunters, pedestrians, and recreational
vehicles use the road. (R. 347: Page 240).
Kane County maintained all of the roads in the Strawberry Valley and Ponderosa
Villa Subdivisions including the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Pages
121-122).
Kane County maintained the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road for several years prior
to the lawsuit. (R. 347: Pages 121-122).
Kane County placed a yield sign on Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road at the top of
the hill. (R. 347: Page 123)
Paul Fullmer was the fire chief of Cedar Mountain Fire District. (R. 347: Page 247)
Paul Fullmer testified that as a person who is familiar with special miaps, he could
locate the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on the 1960 map as a line road. (R.
347: Pages 250-252)
Paul Fullmer testified he recalled using the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road in the
mid-1960's because of the post sale timber, and that he utilized it for fire fighting
and other forestry purposes such as tree planting, logging, etc. (R. 347: Pages 252253).
Paul Fullmer testified that prior to 1967 Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was a well
traveled road, and that he personally drove it in 1966. (R. 347: Pages 254, 258).
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28.

Paul Fullmer saw hunters use the road. (R. 347: Page 255).

29.

Paul Fullmer uses the road to get access to forest land. (R. 347: Page 255).
C. Conclusion
As is evident from the marshaled evidence, the Court had before it numerous

individuals who were familiar with and had in fact used the road long before Plaintiffs came
on the scene. In fact, the Trial Court found in its Finding No. 8 and 9, as set forth above,
that the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was already in existence at the time Plaintiffs
purchase the property and the only apparent dispute was as to its graded condition.
Additionally, the Court had before it numerous witnesses who were in and around the
property and the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road far more often than Plaintiffs. The Court
admitted as much in its Finding No. 34 wherein it stated that:
Also during the 1970's and into the 1980's the plaintiff James
R. Wilhelm was actively involved in a professional career
outside the state of Utah and along with his wife was only an
infrequent visitor to the cabin they constructed.
All the witnesses who testified about the historical existence of the road and its use, with
the exception of Plaintiff, who was nothing more than an "infrequent visitor", testified that
the road had existed long before the subdivision was developed and that it received
extensive use both by them and by others witnessed by them. And, each of the witnesses
who so testified, with the exception of Plaintiff, spent most of the summers and a good
portion of the winters resident on the property and used the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm
Road.
This is important. The Court had before it witnesses who testified extensively about
the historical and continued use of the road. The Court had not one witness before it that
could actually and credibly contradict this testimony-not one. The only witness for
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Plaintiffs was Plaintiff, James R. Wilhelm, and he admitted that he was very rarely at the
site. In fact, even the Court Admitted this very important and salient fact as set forth in
Finding No. 34. The reality is ^hat the testimony of those that frequently traveled the road
and witnessed others doing Ihe same stands before the Trial Court and this Court
uncontradicted.
It is clear, therefore, aftkr Defendants have marshaled the evidence, that the Trial
Court's findings are against the clear weight of the evidence and that a mistake has been
made. As a result, this Court should set aside any and all findings that attempt to limit both
the historical existence of the jroad and the scope and amount of its use.
POINT II
IS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT
THERE WAS NOT A TEN-YEAR PERIOD OF
UNINTERRUPTED
USE
CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS?

The trial court made tl|ie following finding with respect to a ten-year period of
uninterrupted use:
44.

At no time between the time of contracting to purchase Lots 38 and
39 and the filing of this law suit was there a ten year period of
uninterrupted us<k of the disputed road by members of the public.

Appellants submit that this "finding" is actually a conclusion. In so far as it is a conclusion,
its legal sufficiency is discussed and challenged hereafter. Through an abundance of
caution and to assist this Court in understanding the problems inherent in this statement,
whether it is a finding or conclusion, Appellants will treat this statement as if it were a
finding and go through the marshaling exercise.
A. Evidence Supporting Finding
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1.

2.

3.

4.

Plaintiff testified that in 1973 the road was temporarily blocked by Garkane
Power, and/or its agents, who dug a trench across the road for the purpose
of installing underground power lines to supply power to lot owners in the
subdivision. (R. 347: Pages 50, 78). The trench was approximately 4 feet
deep, 18 inches across and impeded traffic on the road for approximately
one week. (R. 347: Pages 78, 82, 127).
Plaintiff further testified that on Memorial Day Weekend in 1980, he blocked
the road at the top of Lot 38 with dead aspen trees. (R. 347: Pages 40, 49).
Plaintiff further testified that in June of 1980 he drove the road and there
were no aspen trees blocking the road. (R. 347: Page 49).
Plaintiff also testified that in 1986, he pulled a 1959 Oldsmobile across the
road for a period of two or three days. (R. 347: Page 53). Plaintiff thereafter
testified that when he left he pulled said vehicle out of the road. (R. 347:
Page 55).
Plaintiff further testified that in 1993 he pulled construction material across
the road in an attempt to block the same. (R. 347: Page 59).
B. Evidence Contrary to Finding

1.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

The Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was constructed in 1966. (R. 347:
Page 116).
The Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road followed an old Timber Road which
was there before the property was purchased by Defendants. (R. 347: Pages
117-118, 155-156, 177).
At the time Plaintiff purchased the properties, a rough road had been graded
in across Lots 30 and 39, linking Strawberry Valley to Ponderosa Villa. The
road is identified as the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Pages
112, 127).
Plaintiff asserts that no road traversed the property, but only a four-wheel
drive track crossed Lot 38. (R. 347: Page 31).
Bill Pringle testified that when Plaintiff purchased the lot, the Valley View
Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road. (R. 347: Page 178)
Wallace Hoist testified that when he purchased his lot, the Valley View
Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road when he was first there. (R. 347:
Page 213)
Harry Moyer testified that he purchased his lot in 1967, and constructed his
cabin in 1968 and that the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow
road in 1968. (R. 347: Pages 233-35)
Wallace Hoist testified that he purchased a lot in 1968 and testified that he
went and looked at the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision and drove up the Valley
View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Page 199).
Wallace Hoist testified that the only way he new how to get to Ponderosa
Villa Subdivision was on the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Page
201).
Wallace Hoist testified that he knew the road was there before he built his
cabin which was in 1969 or 1970. (R. 347: Page 212)
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11.
12.
13.

14.

15.
16.

17.

18.

19.

20.
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.

26.

In 1970, Plaintiff!commenced construction of his cabin. (R. 347: Page 33).
Plaintiff asserts that the first time he noticed Valley View DriveA/Vilhelm Road
through his property was on September 18, 1972. (R. 347: Page 35).
Between 1973 and 1979, Plaintiff admitted that, on occasion, they witnessed
strangers on Va ley View Drive/Wilhelm Road with Mr. Farney but claimed
that there was not a significant amount of use on the road until 1979. (R.
347: Page 57).
In 1968, Milt Farney took numerous people up the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm
Road to show them property in the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision. (R. 347:
Page 119)
Milt Farney traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a daily basis
between the years 1967 through 1980. (R. 347: Page 126)
Bill Pringle trave ed the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a daily basis,
sometimes hundreds of times each summer between 1968-1990 and the first
time Pringle ever had knowledge that the road was blocked was in the mid
1990's. (R. 347: Page 186).
Ronald Lloyd Graham traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a
regular basis, daily basis, and sometimes several times a day, and never
saw the road blocked in 1973-74 or 1980. (R. 347: Page 219).
Ronald Lloyd Graham traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a
regular basis, on weekends and vacation days, especially memorial day
weekends, in 1986 and other years and he and never saw the road blocked.
(R. 347: Page 221).
Ronald Lloyd Graham testified that he saw strangers, hunters, snowmobilers,
forest service, pedestrians, and was able to use the road anytime he
pleased. (R. 347: Pages 222-224).
Harry Moyer testified that he saw strangers, hunters, pedestrians, and
recreational vehicles use the road. (R. 347: Page 240).
Kane County maintained all of the roads in the Strawberry Valley and
Ponderosa Villa Subdivisions including the Valley View DriveA/Vilhelm Road.
(R. 347: Pages 121-122).
Kane County maintained the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road for several
years prior to thd lawsuit. (R. 347: Pages 121-122).
Kane County placed a yield sign on Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road at the
top of the hill. (R. 347: Page 123)
Paul Fullmer was the fire chief of Cedar Mountain Fire District. (R. 347:
Page 247)
Paul Fullmer testified that as a person who is familiar with special maps, he
could locate the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on the 1960 map as a line
road. (R. 347: pkges 250-252)
Paul Fullmer testified he recalled using the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road
in the mid-1960's because of the post sale timber, and that he utilized it for
fire fighting and other forestry purposes such as tree planting, logging, etc.
(R. 347: Page 2^2-253).
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27.

28.
29.

Paul Fullmer testified that prior to 1967 Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was
a well traveled road, and that he personally drove it in 1966. (R. 347: Pages
254, 258).
Paul Fullmer saw hunters use the road. (R. 347: Page 255).
Paul Fullmer uses the road to get access to forest land. (R. 347: Page 255).
C. Conclusion

There are two things to consider here. First, and this is discussed in more detail
below, whether the blockings testified to by Plaintiff were sufficient to interrupt the public's
use of the road and prevent uninterrupted use for a period of ten-years. Appellants argue
below that such blockings do not constitute an interruption of the use of the road as
required by law. Second, is whether the finding is clearly erroneous. All of Plaintiffs
testimony involved minor blockages such as trees or a vehicle placed in the road for a very
brief period of time or even a blockage by another entity altogether that Plaintiff tries to use
to his benefit as if it demonstrated his intent to exclude the public therefrom. Before this
Finding could be operative as either a finding or a conclusion the trial court would have had
to find or conclude that the above blockages were sufficient to prevent a ten-year
uninterrupted use of the road. The trial court never made this kind of a finding or
conclusion. As such, therefore, this Finding is not supported by the evidence, is clearly
erroneous and a mistake has been made and this Court should overturn and/or strike this
Finding in its entirety.
POINT III
ARE THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS
SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT
AND/OR ARE THE
CONCLUSIONS
CORRECT?
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The question of whether a trial court's findings of fact are sufficient to support its
conclusions of law is reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,
782 (Utah 1991); Kunzler v. 0 'De//, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1993); Woodward v.
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (U ah App. 1991); State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah
App. 1991). Additionally, conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Id.
The trial court did not niimber its conclusions of law but instead opted to make them
in a narrative manner. Appellants therefore refer to the conclusions by paragraph number
so as to aid this Court in it^ review of the conclusions and in following Appellants'
argument.
1. Paragraph 1
When Pine Meadows and its close circle of owners, officers and
directors selected among the old unimproved roads those for inclusion in its
formal plats, it necessarily evidenced its intent to abandon others not so
included. The evidence is clear that, for whatever reason, defendants did
not include as a plattecpl road the old logger/hunter road which apparently
crossed a portion of Ldts 38, 39 and 40. Rather, defendants platted new
roads, one of which services ithe same purpose historically served by the old
roadway in question, kane County accepted the plats with the lots and
dedicated roads as shown thereon. If the County or the defendants required
additional access or intended some other road to be recognized, it should
have been shown on
plat. It is untenable as a matter of law for either
defendants or the Courity to include some old unimproved roads, elevating
them to the status of platted roads, exclude others and then claim those
excluded encumber lots which appear on the face of the plat to be
unencumbered. The incongruence of such a claim is further heightened by
the recordation of restrictive covenants which provide that each lot is at a
minimum permissible
and preclude any sale or disposition otherwise.
Moreover, Pine Meadows' conveyance by warranty deed carried with it the
statutory guarantee of 'quiet possession" and "that the premises are free
from all encumbrances and that Pine Meadows would "forever warrant and
defend the title
against all lawful claims whatsoever."1 UCA §57-1-12.
Under the facts of this qase,, these defendants are precluded from asserting
1

This statement is contralry to the applicable statute of limitations that is discussed
elsewhere in this Brief.
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that a public thoroughfare existed when the plats were recorded in 1968 and
1969 and when the deeds were issued to plaintiffs in 1972 and 1975; and
this is so even if the proof were sufficient to establish a pre-existing "public
thoroughfare" which the Court concludes it is not.
Analysis
Some of the above conclusion is arguably supported by the findings. However, the
real problem with this conclusion is that it does not speak to the issues in this case and
insofar as it does it is incorrect as a matter of law. The conclusions sites a number of
things including Appellants' failure to properly record the Pine Valley/Wilhelm road on the
plat that was accepted by Kane County, the size of the lots and the issuance of warranty
deeds. None of these things or the others cited in the conclusion are relevant to the issue
of the public thoroughfare. If there was a public thoroughfare it would not matter if the road
was not recorded on the deed, size of the lots or the warranty deeds. The question
revolves around whether there was a ten-year (or more) uninterrupted use of the road.
This conclusion summarily, and without any relevant support in the findings, simply states
that the road "is not" a public thoroughfare without any of the legally sufficient indicia of
what constitutes or does not constitute a public thoroughfare. This conclusion is full of
legal error, is not supported by any relevant findings, is conclusory in nature and should
be set aside.
2. Paragraphs 2 and 3
(2) Defendants' claim that a public thoroughfare thereafter came into
existence is not supported by the facts. The governing statute, §72-5-104,
provides as follows:
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often
years.
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The law in Utah is well fettled that the burden of proof is on the side trying
to prove dedication to the public. This burden can only be met by proof
which is clear and convncing Moreover, there is a presumption in favor of
the property owner and his ownership is accorded a high degree of sanctity,
It has also been held• thit use by neighboring landowners and their personal
visitors is not sufficienj|t to prove public use. These persons cannot be
numbered in the class Of members of the general public using such road in
a fashion that might np^n into a dedication under the road statute. The use
must be such that it is "thoroughfare" where members of the public have
a general right of passage, Finally, it is generally recognized that
unambiguous acts by'the owner which evidences an intention to exclude the
public from uninterrupted use destroys the prescriptive right and the 10-year
period must begin anevy
(Citations omitted.)
The evidence laid before the Court by defendants was less than "clear
and convincing". Defendants called several persons that testified of the use
over a couple of decadps before being completely blocked out, but for the
most part this was use by neighboring lot-owners, or those who provided
services to them; and ^he absence of extensive development, particularly
during the early years, lijnited the nature and opportunity for conflict and also
reduced the occurrences where plaintiffs' efforts to blockade coincided with
others' efforts to use. But some confrontations did exist, sufficient to
evidence plaintiffs' intent to exclude the public from uninterrupted use.
Furthermore, the blockade devices employed by plaintiffs, including those
that were of a permanent nature during the 1990's, were removed when
plaintiffs where not around.
Analysis
Appellants have no problem with paragraph 2 insofar as it accurately states the law.
The real problem is evident in paragraph 3. Appellants' witnesses who testified to using
the road and witnessing others using the road were not neighboring landowners or those
providing services to them. There are no findings supporting this statement. Additionally,
the law states that "adjoining landowners" may not claim a public thoroughfare, it does not
state that "neighboring landowners" may not claim a public thoroughfare. Marden R. Kohler
and Joy J. Kohler v. Martin, 9]I6 P.2d 910 (1996). None of Appellants' witnesses were
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adjoining landowners. Therefore, this is an erroneous statement and this Court should set
it aside.
Additionally, the trial court states that the level of development in the subdivision
directly correlated to the level and amount of traffic on the road and that this erroneous fact
is somehow relevant. There is no finding supporting this conclusion. The only evidence
(although there must be a finding) was a statement made by Plaintiff who by the trial
court's own admission was a very infrequent visitor to the property (see Finding of Fact
number 34) and had no real ongoing knowledge of how the road was used and by whom.
Moreover, Plaintiff's statement is clearly contradicted by all of Appellant's witnesses who
frequently used and witnessed others using the road during all times relevant to this action.
None of them testified that the amount of development was somehow related to the
amount of traffic on the road since many of them used the road all the time and witnessed
members of the public using the road for recreational purposes regardless of the level of
development. This statement is both erroneous and irrelevant and should be set aside.
The trial court next discusses the fact that since there was little development and
little traffic there were not many confrontations between Plaintiff and people trying to use
the road although such confrontations existed and said confrontations were sufficient to
evidence plaintiffs' intent to exclude the public from "uninterrupted" use. This is again an
erroneous and irrelevant statement. There was only one confrontation that Plaintiff
testified to and that was with a person now deceased. Plaintiff did indicate that when he
was there he told people trying to use the road not to and that they generally respected his
wishes. However, the trial court found that Plaintiff was but an infrequent visitor to the
property. Therefore, there simply could not have been that many confrontations especially
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because the trial court has made the claim that travel over the road was infrequent due to
the lack of development. Thus, the confrontations, if any, did not rise to the level of
constituting a "blockage" of the road sufficient to defeat a claim of a public thoroughfare.
This point is covered in significant detail below.
Finally, the trial court claims that the blockages Plaintiff put in the road were
removed when he was not around. Appellants are not certain the relevance of this
statement. The few and inadequate blockages that Plaintiff placed on the road were
always quickly removed.
Conclusion
The conclusions of law, besides being confusing, are not supported by the findings
and those that are have no relevance or impact upon the ultimate question of whether a
public thoroughfare existed and they certainly do not defeat a claim of a public
thoroughfare. As such, Appellants request that this Court overturn and/or set aside the
erroneous conclusions of law.
POINT IV
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING
THAT THERE WAS NOT AN UNINTERRUPTED
TEN-YEAR PERIOD OF USE OF THE ROAD
BY THE PUBLIC PRIOR TO PLAINTIFFS'
PERMANENT BLOCKING THEREOF
The critical nature of th& trial court's failure to make adequate findings of fact and
conclusions of law will now become readily apparent. As stated above, one of the statutory
requirements to establish a public road is that the public use be "continuous" for a period
of not less than ten years, See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2000). Therefore the
definition of "continuous use" is crucial in the determination of whether a road was, is or
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has become a "public" road. Again, the trial court to gloss over these important definitions
and criteria and did not make adequate findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect
thereto.
The Utah Supreme Court in Crane v. Crane, 683 P:2d 1062 (Utah 1984) specifically
addressed the issue of "continuous use" in determining whether a prescriptive easement
had attached to a property, as follows:
A need not be "regular" or "constant" in order to be
"continuous." All that is necessary is that the use be as often
as is required by the nature of the use and the needs of the
claimant.
Id at 1064 (citing Richards v. Pine Ranches, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977).
Defendants introduced the following testimony at trial with respect to the use of the
road:
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

10.

The Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was constructed in 1966. (R. 347: Page 116).
The Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road followed an old Timber Road which was there
before the property was purchased by Defendants. (R. 347: Page 117 -118, 155156, 177).
At the time Plaintiff purchased the properties, a rough road had been graded in
across Lots 30 and 39, linking Strawberry Valley to Ponderosa Villa. The road is
identified as the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Pages 112, 127).
Plaintiff asserts that no road traversed the property, but only a four-wheel drive track
crossed Lot 38. (R. 347: Page 31).
Aerial photographs clearly depict the establishment of the road. (R. Trial CourtExhibits 6-13; not provided by Court: See attached addendum)
Bill Pringle testified that when Plaintiff purchased the lot, the Valley View
Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road. (R. 347: Page 178)
Wallace Hoist testified that when he purchased his lot, the Valley View
Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road when he was first there. (R. 347: Page 213)
Harry Moyer testified that he purchased his lot in 1967, and constructed his cabin
in 1968 and that the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road in 1968.
(R. 347: Page 233-35)
Wallace Hoist testified that he purchased a lot in 1968 and testified that he went
and looked at the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision and drove up the Valley View
Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Page199).
Wallace Hoist testified that the only way he new how to get to Ponderosa Villa
Subdivision was on the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Page 201).
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11.
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.

18.
19.

20.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.

28.

29.
30.

Wallace Hoist testified Ithat he knew the road was there before he built his cabin
which was in 1969 or 1970. (R. 347: Page 212)
In 1970, Plaintiff commenced construction of his cabin. (R. 347: Page 33)
Plaintiff asserts that the first time he noticed Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road
through his property was on September 18, 1972. (R. 347: Page 35).
Between 1973 and 1979, Plaintiff admitted that, on occasion, they witnessed
strangers on Valley Vew Drive/Wilhelm Road with Mr. Farney but claimed that
there was not a significant amount of use on the road until 1979. (R. 347: Page 57).
In 1968, Milt Farney took numerous people up the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road
to show them property n the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision. (R. 347: Page 119)
Milt Farney traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a daily basis between
the years 1967 through 1980. (R. 347: Page 126)
Bill Pringle traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a daily basis,
sometimes hundreds of times each summer between 1968-1990 and the first time
Pringle ever had knowledge that the road was blocked was in the mid 1990's. (R.
347: Page 186).
Ronald Lloyd Graham traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a regular
basis, daily basis, and sometimes several times a day, and never saw the road
blocked in 1973-74 or 1980. (R. 347: Page 219).
Ronald Lloyd Graham traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a regular
basis, on weekends ana vacation days, especially memorial day weekends, in 1986
and other years and he and never saw the road blocked. (R. 347: Page 221).
Ronald Lloyd Graham testified that he saw strangers, hunters, snowmobilers, forest
service, pedestrians, dnd was able to use the road anytime he pleased. (R. 347:
Pages 222-224).
Harry Moyer testified thkt he saw strangers, hunters, pedestrians, and recreational
vehicles use the road. «R. 347: Page 240).
Kane County maintained all of the roads in the Strawberry Valley and Ponderosa
Villa Subdivisions including the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Pages
121-122)
Kane County maintained the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road for several years prior
to the lawsuit. (R. 347 Page 121-122).
Kane County placed a yield sign on Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road at the top of
the hill. (R. 347: Page 123)
Paul Fullmer was the fire chief of Cedar Mountain Fire District. (R. 347: Page 247)
Paul Fullmer testified that as a person who is familiar with special nnaps, he could
locate the Valley View prive/Wilhelm Road on the 1960 map as a line road. (R.
347: Pages 250-252)
Paul Fullmer testified hfe recalled using the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road in the
mid-1960's because of the post sale timber, and that he utilized it for fire fighting
and other forestry purposes such as tree planting, logging, etc. (R. 347: Pages 252253).
Paul Fullmer testified that prior to 1967 Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was a well
traveled road, and that he personally drove it in 1966. (R. 347: Pages 254, 258).
Paul Fullmer saw hunters use the road. (R. 347: Page 255).
Paul Fullmer uses the r|oad to get access to forest land. (R. 347: Page 255).
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31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

Forest service aerial photographs show that the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road
existed in 1960 as a mountain road. (Trial Court- Exhibit 6; not provided by Court:
See attached addendum)2
Forest service aerial photographs clearly show that the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm
Road existed as an improved road in 1967. (Trial Court- Exhibit 10; not provided
by Court: See attached addendum)3
Forest service close-up aerial photographs clearly show that the Valley View
Drive/Wilhelm Road existed as an improved road in 1967. (Trial Court- Exhibit 11;
not provided by Court: See attached addendum)4
Forest service aerial photographs clearly show that the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm
Road existed in 1977. (Trial Court- Exhibit 12; not provided by Court: See Attached
Addendum)5
Forest service close-up aerial photographs clearly show that the Valley View
Drive/Wilhelm Road existed as an improved road in 1977. (Trial Court- Exhibit 13;
not provided by Court: See attached addendum)6
The difference in the condition of the road between 1967 and 1976 is minor as
evidenced by a comparison of the two photographs. (Trial Court- ExhibitslO, 12;
not provided by Court: See Attached Addendum)
The above testimony clearly demonstrates that the road was subject to "continuous

use" by numerous individuals most of whom had also seen others, often strangers,
frequently using the road. Even Plaintiff admitted that when he was present, which was
seldom, he also saw strangers use the road and when asked not to, they complied with his
requests. Furthermore, the road accesses forest property and was open to hunters,
snowmobilers, and other recreationists as well as forest personnel.

2

Plaintiff requested a copy of all documents from the Trial Court but was provided only a
copy of the transcript and pleadings. No Exhibits presented at the time of trial were provided.
Because of the limited number of Exhibits utilized in Plaintiffs brief a motion by Plaintiff
requesting this Court to order transfer of the Exhibits to the Court of Appeals has been submitted
contemporaneously herewith.
3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Id.
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The next critical questidn is whether any of Plaintiffs' verbal protestations, blocking
attempts, or those imputed to him such as the trench dug by Garkane Power, were
sufficient to cause a blocking of the road so as to defeat any ten-year period of
uninterrupted use. In Memmottv. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme
Court was faced with a set of facts similar to the present case. In Memmott, the plaintiffs
erected a gate across a road iji dispute and placed great reliance on the existence of the
gate in showing that the road was not a public thoroughfare because of the "break" in
usage allegedly caused by the erection of the gate. The Court looked to the history of the
road and determined that "if a road were a public thoroughfare before the gate was
erected, the erection of the gatp does not change the public nature of the road." Id. at 753
(citing Sullivan v. Condas, 290 IP. 954 (1930). The Memmott Court also took judicial notice
as to the purpose for which th^ road was originally constructed. In its final determination
the Court relied on what it termed "substantial" evidence that showed the road had been
originally constructed under the protection of federal statute on public lands by hands of
"the public." Id. at 753. Tes imony in the present case, as indicated above, from an
uninterested party indicates thkt there was a use of the Wilhelm road prior to 1966 for use
by forestry personnel and oth^r members of the public. The court made the following
findings with respect to the exstence of a road:
8.

Prior to recording any of the subdivision plats, and in the area encompassed
by the same,.there were several old unimproved one-vehicle-width roads that
had been used by loggers, hunters, ranchers, forestry personnel and others.
These old roads are barely visible on aerial photography dating to the early
1960's and supplied to the court. The roads consisted essentially of tire
tracks left over a period of time and appear not to follow a well-thought plan.
One of the old roads crossed portions of Lots 38 and 39, purchased by
plaintiffs from de fendant Pine Meadows, and also crossed a corner of Lot 40.
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In order to block a road that has either become a public road or to interrupt a ten
year period of uninterrupted use, there must be an actual interference with the claimant's
use by means of erecting physical obstacles or otherwise use of the servient parcel in such
a manner so as to prevent the adverse use. It is not sufficient to attempt an interruption
of the public use. See, e.g., Margoline v. Holefelder, 218 A.2d 227, 228 (Pa. 1966)
(holding that a blockade of a disputed driveway for two days did not constitute actual
interruption when there was no evidence of attempted use). It is also not sufficient to
render a use less convenient. See, e.g., Brown v. Ware, 630 P.2d 545, 547 n.2 (Ariz. App.
1981) (holding that the stringing of barbed wire across a roadway was deemed insufficient
to interrupt usage where the wire was knocked down a day after it was erected); South
Norwalk Lodge v. Palco Hats, Inc., 100 A.2d 735, 737 (Conn. 1953) (stating that claimant
continually removed barriers from right-of-way and continued use thereof); King v. Corsini,
335 N.E.2d 561, 565 (III. App. 1975) (holding that acts of landowner blocking road for short
periods did not interrupt public use). The obstruction must in fact interfere with the
claimant's usage. See, e.g., Concerned Citizens of Brunswick County Taxpayers Ass'n
v. State ex rel. Rhodes, 404 S.E.2d 677, 687 (N.C. 1991); Reed v. Piedimonte, 138 A.2d
937, 937 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that there was no evidence that the erections of temporary
barriers "ever effectively interfered with, or disturbed, plaintiffs continuous use of the
driveway").
In Hammond v. Johnson, 66 P.2d 894 (1937), the court stated that:
To interrupt the continuity of the adverse occupant's possession, there must
be a physical interruption of the adverse possession, or a suit or some
unequivocal act of ownership which interrupts the exercise of the right
claimed and being enjoyed by the adverse claimant. 2 C.J.S., Adverse
Possession, p. 701, and cases cited. Such interruption of the adverse
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claimants occupancy onuser, to stop the running of the statute, must be of
the same definite chaijacter as must the adverse claimant's occupancy or
user, to stop the running of the statute, must be of the same definite
character as must the adverse claimant's possession and user be to start the
statute running. The interruption must be open, notorious, and under claim
of right such as to manifest an intention to repossess the property and
dispossess the occupant, and be a challenge to his right and dominion. It
must bear on its face an unequivocal intention to take possession.
There was never a sufficient effort on the part of Plaintiff to block the public
thoroughfare once it existed. I|f the erection of a gate blocking the roadway was insufficient
in Memmott, then certainly the minimal efforts by Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs verbal
protestations to a few passer- ^yes, prior to 1993, fall woefully short as set forth hereafter.
There were three attempts to block the road in the present case between the time
Plaintiff purchased the land and the initiation of this lawsuit-a period of over thirty years.
And, of critical importance, one of the blockages was not even by Plaintiffs and cannot be
imputed to them in order to prevent the ten-year period of uninterrupted use. Plaintiff,
James R. Wilhelm, testified that he attempted to block the road, or at least the road was
blocked, on the following occasions:
1.

2.

Plaintiff testified that in 1973-74 the road was temporarily blocked by
Garkane Power, and/or its agents, who dug a trench across the road
for the purpose Of installing underground power lines to supply power
to lot owners in (he subdivision. (R. 347: Pages 50, 78).7
Plaintiff further testified that on Memorial Day Weekend in 1980, he blocked
the road at the tpp of Lot 38 with dead aspen trees. (R. 347: Pages 40, 49).

7

As set forth below, the (tourt allowed this blocking to somehow be imputed to the
efforts of Plaintiffs to block the ijoad and as a manifestation to the public of their efforts to
exclude the public therefrom This is patently absurd and contrary to the law. This blockage had
nothing to do with Plaintiffs' efforts and furthermore could not be considered a manifestation of
their desire to exclude the public therefrom. There is also a question as to whether Plaintiffs
were even aware of this blockage before they began to prepare for this action at which point they
tried to use it to their advantage, Also, as argued below, without this blockage there clearly was
a ten-year period of uninterrupted use. This is why it is so critical that this Court be able to
examine the individual blockages which the Trial Court utterly failed to identify.
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3.

4.

Plaintiff further testified that in June of 1980 he drove the road and there
were no aspen trees blocking the road. (R. 347: Page 49).
Plaintiff also testified that in 1986, he pulled a 1959 Oldsmobile across the
road for a period of a few days. (R. 347: Page 53). Plaintiff thereafter
testified that when he left he pulled said vehicle out of the road. (R. 347:
Page 55).
Plaintiff further testified that in 1993 he pulled construction material across
the road in an attempt to block the same. (R. 347: Page 59).8

None of these blockages constitute a sufficient blockage or interference with use to defeat
a claim of a ten-year uninterrupted use.

However, each blockage deserves some

additional analysis.
1973 Blockage
Plaintiff testified that the road was temporarily blocked in 1973 by Garkane Power,
a local utility, for the purpose of digging a trench to bury electrical power lines. Plaintiffs
had nothing to do with this blocking other than facilitating the unified ordering of power by
a group of homeowners desiring power. Appellants are aware of no law, in any jurisdiction,
that would allow the imputation of this blockage to Plaintiffs and that it somehow
manifested Plaintiffs' intent to keep the public from using the road. The claim that it
somehow can be imputed to Plaintiffs is patently absurd. It should also be noted that
defendant's witnesses have no collection of the trench blocking the road indicating that it
did not last as long and Plaintiff claims.
Plaintiffs purchased their lots in 1968. Even if this Court does not allow Appellants
to go back earlier than Plaintiffs' purchase of their lots, the first attempt to block the road

8

As set forth below, Defendants are not challenging the sufficiency of the blockages
after 1990. The question of the actual or adequacy of the blockages in the 1970s and 1980s
however goes to the heart of the Trial Court's findings and conclusions with respect to the
existence of lack of existence of a ten-year uninterrupted period of use.
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by Plaintiffs was in 1980, as d scussed below. Therefore, if the Garkane Power trenching
is not counted as a blockage by Plaintiffs, there was an uncontroverted twelve-year
uninterrupted period of use by the public prior to Plaintiffs' attempt to block the road in
1980. As set forth above, all p a t is required is a ten-year period of uninterrupted use of
the road.
1980 Blockage
Plaintiff testified that dn Memorial Day Weekend in 1980 he pulled some dead
aspen trees across the road qt the top of his property. He further testified that in June of
that year, only a few weeks later, he drove the road and the aspen trees had been
removed. None of Defendant!:Is witnesses, who used the road on a regular basis, had any
knowledge of this minor and very temporary attempt to block the road in 1980.
Furthermore, this blockade fai s to provide any notification to the general public of an intent
to impede traffic. Dead aspen trees are indigenous to the area and could have been
construed by any passerby as a simple failure to fasten down a load of debris being
transported for either firewood or disposal on forest land.
As is evident from the case law set forth above, the blockage must be of a
substantial nature and it must actually interfere with use of the road. The aspen tree
blockage was temporary, minor and it was removed almost immediately. As such it did not
interfere with the public's use of the road and cannot, as a matter of law, be considered
a sufficient blockage of the road to defeat its uninterrupted use. The next blockage didn't
occur until 1986 and if the 1980 blockage was insufficient to defeat uninterrupted use of
the road, which it is not, then there was a period running from 1968 to 1986 (18 years)
without an adequate attempt tp block the road. And even if this Court considered it such,
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the road in question already has more than a ten-year period of uninterrupted use. The
nature of this blockage therefore must be so substantial and of such duration that it will
defeat what has already become a public thoroughfare-a few dead aspen trees simply
cannot defeat what is already a public road.
1986 Blockage
Plaintiff testified that in 1986, he pulled a 1959 Oldsmobile across the road for a
period of several days. Plaintiff thereafter testified that when he left he pulled said vehicle
out of the road. Again, under the case law set forth above, this was not a sufficient
blockage to defeat the uninterrupted use of the road. And as set forth above with respect
to the dead aspen trees, even if this Court considered it such, the road in question already
has more than a ten-year period of uninterrupted use. The nature of this blockage
therefore must be so substantial and of such duration that it will defeat what has already
become a public thoroughfare-pulling a car across the road for a few days is simply not
sufficient to defeat what already is a public road.
Conclusion
The trial court clearly erred in finding Plaintiffs testimony sufficient to support an
interrupted use of the road. This is especially true with respect to the Garkane Power
trenching, but is also true with respect to the dead aspen trees and the short duration
blockage by an antique vehicle. The trial court's findings and conclusions on this issue,
sparse as they may be, are contrary to law. This Court should therefore reverse the trial
court's conclusions in this regard and issue and opinion that the road in question became
and remained a public road despite any blockage attempts.
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POINT V
ARE THFC TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF
FACT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ITS
CONCLUSION OF LAW SUFFICIENTLY
DETAILED TO SUPPORT ITS ULTIMATE
DECISION THAT THERE WAS A LEGALLY
SUFFICIENT BLOCKING OF THE ROAD AND
THAT THE ROAD WAS NOT A PUBLIC
THOROUGHFARE?
The question of the adequacy or sufficiency of the Court's Findings of Fact is
reviewed for correctness. Sde, e.g., State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991);
Kunzlerv. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1993); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d
474, 477 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah App 1991). In this
case the Court did not make any specific findings with respect to the blockage of the road.
This is a critical error on the part of the Court because the nature and number of alleged
blockages are critical in determining whether there actually was a blockage, as a matter
of law-this is the heart and soul of this case. And, in fact, the Court is required to make
clear and concise findings of fact to support its conclusions which in this case it has not.
In fact, in this case, the Court made only the following findings with respect to the
blockage:
36.

37.

39.

During the 1970'b and 1980's, plaintiff on several occasions undertook efforts
to block access to the road, sometimes with logs, sometimes with vehicles
and by reliance upon trenching (of which the plaintiff was not aware)
undertaken by others and sometimes by personal notice. Some of plaintiffs
[sic] blocking efforts resulted in confrontations with would-be users where
plaintiffs made clear their opposition to continued use.
Plaintiffs' blocking efforts were not exhaustive but neither was the amount of
use. . . .
Pine Meadows' kgent, Bill Pringle, was somewhat aware of plaintiffs' effort
to block access ^nd use over the years, and had a clear memory of the more
permanent and extensive effort during the 1990's [This is actually not
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accurate-Mr. Pringle testified that he had no knowledge of any blockage until
the mid-1960s (R. 347: Pages 189-191)].
43.

44.

The permanent type devices installed by plaintiffs to block access to the road
were physically removed on more than one occasion. Plaintiffs continued to
use the cabin only for recreation use and were not present when removed.
At no time between the time of contracting to purchase Lots 38 and 39 and
the filing of this law suit was there a ten-year period of uninterrupted use of
the disputed road by members of the public.

Based on these findings the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had adequately blocked
the road and that there never was an uninterrupted ten-year period of use. The trial court
then went on to make the following conclusion, presumably based upon the above findings:
The evidence laid before the Court by defendants was less
than "clear and convincing". Defendants called several
persons that testified of the use over a couple of decades
before being completely blocked out, but for the most part this
was use by neighboring lot-owners, or those who provided
services to them; and the absence of extensive development,
particularly during the early years, limited the nature and
opportunity for conflict and also reduced the occurrences
where plaintiffs' efforts to blockade coincided with others'
efforts to use. But some confrontations did exist, sufficient to
evidence plaintiffs' intent to exclude the public from
uninterrupted use.
Furthermore, the blockade devices
employed by plaintiffs, including those that were of a
permanent nature during the 1990's, were removed when
plaintiffs were not around.
(R. 347: Page 314).
The problem here is that it is impossible to tell whether a ten year period of
uninterrupted use truly existed. The trial court's findings and conclusions lack sufficient
detail to allow this Court any meaningful appellate review on this issue.

See Michele

Mciver Bell v. Harold Freeman Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (1991); (the trial court will not disturb a
trial court's ruling... .as long as the court "exercises its discretion within the bounds and
under the standards we have set and has supported its decision with adequate findings
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and conclusions."). See also,\Paul Edward Roberts v. Sheri Lynn Roberts, 835 P.2d 193
(1992). This is perplexing because there was testimony by Plaintiff about his specific
attempts to block the road and testimony by a multitude of defense witnesses indicating
that they were not aware of any blockages until the middle of the 90's when their use of the
road was first disturbed. However, the Court glossed over the testimony on this issue from
both sides. The question, anq this is a critical and dispositive question, which if any of the
blocks actually occurred and which, if any of the blocks were adequate to provide the
necessary notice. The Court failed miserably on both accounts of providing this mandatory
information. Furthermore, the Trial Court could not have made appropriate findings even
if it wanted to. Plaintiff, James R. Wilhelm, testified that he attempted to block the road,
or at least the road was blocked, on the following occasions:
1.

2.

3.

Plaintiff testified that iih 1973-74 the road was temporarily blocked by Garkane
Power, and/or its agents, who dug a trench across the road for the purpose of
installing underground power lines to supply power to lot owners in the subdivision.
(R. 347: Pages 50, 78). The trench was approximately 4 feet deep, 18 inches
across. (R. 347: Pagefe 78, 82, 127).9
Plaintiff further testified that on Memorial Day Weekend in 1980, he blocked the
road at the top of Lot 38 with dead aspen trees. (R. 347: Pages 40, 49). Plaintiff'
further testified that in June of 1980 he drove the road and there were no aspen
trees blocking the road. (R. 347: Page 49).10
Plaintiff also testified that in 1986, he pulled a 1959 Oldsmobile across the road for
a period of a few dayp over memorial weekend. (R. 347: Page 53). Plaintiff'
9

As set forth below, the fcourt allowed this blocking to somehow be imputed to the
efforts of Plaintiffs to block the i[oad and as a manifestation of their efforts to exclude the public
therefrom. This is patently absurd and contrary to the law. This blockage had nothing to do with
Plaintiffs' efforts and furthermoile could not be considered a manifestation of their desire to
exclude the public therefrom. A so, as argued below, without this blockage there clearly was a
ten-year period of uninterrupted jise. This is why it is so critical that this Court be able to
examine the individual blockag<*es which the Trial Court utterly failed to identify.
10

As also set forth belo^,, the blockage must be of a permanent nature before the law will
consider a blocking adequate for the purposes asserted by Plaintiffs. This particular alleged
blockage was not of such a natur^
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4.

thereafter testified that when he left he pulled said vehicle out of the road. (R. 347:
Page 55).
Plaintiff further testified that in 1993 he pulled construction material across the road
in an attempt to block the same. (R. 347: Page 59).11
The Trial Court failed to specifically identify when and how long each of these

alleged blockages existed, if at all. The Trial Court merely glossed this whole important
and dispositive issue over, and ignored the legal ramifications of each alleged blockage by
lumping all the blockages together and indicating that they occurred "[d]uring the 1970fs
and 1980's." This Court should overturn the ruling of the Trial Court on this failure alone.
Stated differently, the Trial Court is not allowed to make findings and conclusions that are
unsupported by the evidence as it has done in this case.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS
NOT A TEN-YEAR UNINTERRUPTED PERIOD
OF USE OF THE ROAD AND THAT THE ROAD
WAS THEREFORE NOT A PUBLIC
THOROUGHFARE
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2000) provides that
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often
years.
Historically, in order for a private road to become a public thoroughfare there must have
been evidence of intent by the owner to dedicate the road to a public use and an

11

As set forth below, Defendants are not challenging the sufficiency of the blockages
after 1990. The question of the actual or adequacy of the blockages in the 1970s and 1980s
however goes to the heart of the Trial Court's findings and conclusions with respect to the
existence of lack of existence of a ten-year uninterrupted period of use.
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acceptance by the public. Gmmor v. Carter, 391 P.2d 426 (Utah 1964). In the last 20
years, however, the Utah Supreme Court has changed the historical rule and stated that
the test is only whether a roadway has been continuously used by members of the general
public for at least ten years and that it is no longer necessary to examine the intent of the
owner. Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447,449 (Utah 1981); see also Kohlerv. Martin, 916
P.2d 910 (Utah App. 1996) (ruling that when a roadway has been continuously used by the
general public for a period greater than ten years, it is impliedly dedicated to the public as
a public highway).
The Utah Supreme Cburt has also provided guidance as to what constitutes
"continuous use" for purposes of determining use over a ten-year period:
A use need not be "regular" or "constant" in order to be
"continuous." All that is necessary is that the use be as often
as required by ?he nature of the use and the needs of the
claimant.
Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 106^, 1064 (Utah 1984) (citing Richards v. Pine Ranch, Inc., 559
P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977)).
Uncontradicted testimony before the Trial Court indicated that the Wilhelm Road
had been used and used often for numerous purposes and by numerous people from the
mid-1960s to the early to md-1990s when it was permanently blocked. The critical
question then becomes whether there was ten-year period of uninterrupted use which
devolves squarely upon the subsidiary question of whether there was a blockage of the
road that was sufficient as ^ matter of law that interfered with a ten-year period of
uninterrupted use.
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There must be an actual interference with the public's use of the road by means of
erecting physical obstacles or otherwise by the use of the servient parcel in such a way as
to prevent the adverse use. It is not sufficient to attempt an interruption. Margoline v.
Hotel'elder, 218 A.2d 227,228 (Pa. 1966) (holding that blockage of a driveway for two days
did not constitute actual interruption when there was no evidence of attempted use during
the blockage).
POINT VII
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY FAILING TO
CONSIDER ALL EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO
THE
EXISTENCE
OF A
PUBLIC
THOROUGHFARE INCLUDING EVIDENCE
PRIOR, DURING AND/OR AFTER THE
WARRANTY DEEDS WERE EXECUTED BY
DEFENDANT.
The trial court entered a Ruling on Summary Judgment Motions on or about March
8,1999 ruling or holding that by virtue of Defendant executing a Warranty Deed, Defendant
was precluded from claiming the existence of a roadway which pre-dates the conveyance.
(R. 165) Presumably such ruling came from the cases cited by Plaintiff, to wit: Jones v.
Grow Inv. & Management Company, 358 P.2d 909 11 Ut.2d 326 (Utah 1961) and BrauerHarrison Inc. v. Comby, 799 P.2d 716 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990).

Both of the cases cited by

Plaintiff were cases dealing with a private easement or the assertion of a private easement.
In Plaintiff's motion only the findings of each case was cited and dicta denoting a different
finding under dissimilar circumstances was never introduced to the court; that is, that under
certain situations, an assertion of the existence of a public road by one who formerly
executed a Warranty Deed may be admissible. Jones specifically states that:
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"if the deed contain^ anything which would indicate that a known
encumbrance was not intended to be within the covenant, the purchaser
cannot claim that such an encumbrance was a breach of covenant.
However, with the possible exception of public easements that are
apparent and in their nature permanent and irremediable, [emphasis
added], mere knowledge of the encumbrance is not sufficient to exclude it
from the operation of the covenant. The intention to exclude an
encumbrance should be manifested in the deed itself, for a resort to oral or
other extraneous evidence would violate several principles of law in regard
to deeds."
This additional language clearlly indicates that the court is permitted to consider evidence
prior to the issuance of the warranty deed when that evidence is utilized for the purpose
of asserting that a public roadway was apparent, permanent and irremediable. Interesting
enough, in Judge Crockett's concurring opinion, he stated that "If the easement is of such
a character and use is open and notorious, and the purchaser knows of its existence, he
should not be permitted to accept the conveyance and then claim breach of covenant with
respect to something about which he had full knowledge." Id. at 912.
It has been one of Defendants' primary contentions that the roadway in dispute is
a public roadway and has been used by the public for more than 25 years, has not been
blocked and was apparent at ihe time Plaintiff purchased the property. Furthermore, the
warranty deed contained language stating that the conveyance was "subject to: covenants,
conditions, restrictions, reservations, rights of way and easement of record' (R. 347: Page
85) If the public roadway existed at the time the deeds were executed, then the
conveyance was subject to the public right of way and Plaintiff was put on notice of the
same.

Furthermore, even if the public road way had not been established for the

prerequisite 10 year period, th s court should find that the execution of the Warranty Deeds
did not foreclose public use o the road or toll the ten year period. Intuitively, by virtue of
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the public thoroughfare doctrine, it is the public who adversely possesses the right of use
and not a single individual. This Court should therefore overturn the Trial Court's ruling on
the Summary Judgment motion and consider facts prior to the issuance of the Warranty
Deed in determining whether a public thoroughfare had already been established by
general public usage. In so doing, there is simply no question that there was considerably
more than a ten-year period of uninterrupted use.
POINT VIII
DID THE COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD NOT
EXPIRED AND THE COURT COULD RELY
UPON THE WARRANTY DEED TO PREVENT
DEFENDANT FROM ASSERTING THE PUBLIC
THOROUGHFARE DOCTRINE
In the statutory warranty deed form, the operative language consists of the verbs
signifying that the grantor "conveys and warrants" the property to the grantee. In using this
language, the grantor not only conveys fee simple title ("together with all of the
appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto belonging"), but does so with five statutory
warranties, three of which are applicable, to wit:
(1) That the grantor guarantees the grantee, and the grantee's heirs and
assigns, in the quiet possession of the premises (covenant of quiet enjoyment);
(2) That the premises are free from all encumbrances (covenant against
encumbrances); and
(3) that the grantor, and the grantor's heirs and personal representatives, will
forever warrant and defend the title of the premises in the grantee and the grantee's
heirs and assigns against all lawful claims (covenant of warranty).
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Covenant (1) is a present covenant, because it was allegedly violated, at the
moment the warranty deed became effective and the statute of limitations began to run
from the time of the conveyance. Covenants (2) and (3) are future covenants, because
they are violated, if at all, only at some time in the future, after the conveyance. For future
covenants, the limitations period begins to run only after disturbance in title occurs. East
Canyon Land & Stock Co. v. Davis & Weber Counties Canal Co., 238 P.280 (Utah 1925).
The scope of the warranties s also subject to restrictions on the property imposed by
public statutes as in this case. If a road was already established or being established by
the public, then the public could continue to utilize the property irrespective of private
transactions occurring on the property until the property owner took affirmative action to
prevent continued use of the road such as blocking the same.
Even though the grantor (Defendant) agrees to warrant the property, it is not without
limitation. This limitation is subject to the statute of limitations which commenced when
Plaintiff Wilhelm viewed the d sturbance. Plaintiff admittedly saw the disturbance in the
early 1970's. (R. 347: Page 35) Therefore, by the time this action was initiated the Statute
of Limitations had long-since lapsed and the Trial Courts reliance on the same to protect
Plaintiffs is misplaced. In the Courts Conclusion of Law, (the trial court did not number its
conclusions of law but instead opted to make them in a narrative manner. Appellants
therefore refer to the conclusiqns by paragraph number so as to aid this Court in its review
of the conclusions),it states:
1. Paragraph 1
Moreover, Pine Meadows' conveyance by warranty deed carried
with it the statutory guarantee of "quiet possession" and "that the premises
are free from all encumbrances" and that Pine Meadows would "forever
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warrant and defend the title . . . against all lawful claims whatsoever." UCA
§57-1-12. Under the facts of this case, these defendants are precluded from
asserting that a public thoroughfare existed when the plats were recorded
in 1968 and 1969 and when the deeds were issued to plaintiffs in 1972 and
1975; and this is so even if the proof were sufficient to establish a preexisting "public thoroughfare" which the Court concludes it is not.
While such an conclusion may be true had this action been brought within the Statute of
Limitations period, it was not. Plaintiffs had six years from the time they discovered the
existence of the road to commence an action for Breach of Warranty of Title against
Defendants which would have lapsed no later than January 6th, 1978 for Lot 39 and
September 25th, 1981 for Lot 38. As previously stated, Plaintiffs commenced the lawsuit
on or about October 23,1996 and are therefore barred by the Statute of Limitations from
a seeking the warranty protection inappropriately afforded by the Trial Court in its
conclusions. Therefore, this court should consider all testimony in determining whether the
road was utilized by the public from the date of its inception or at least until 1960 to the first
time Plaintiffs successfully blocked the road to determine if the general public had a ten
year period of uninterrupted use, and if this court should so find, then it should reverse the
Trial Court and find that the road has been abandoned to public usage.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the road should be deemed as a public road
or the matter should be remanded back to the Court for further findings.
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ADDENDUM

72-5-103

TRANSPORTATION CODE
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(4) adequate drainage in connection with any highway, cut, fill, or
channel change and the maintenance of any highway, cut, fill, or channel
change;
(5) weighing stations, shops, offices, storage buildings and yards, and
road maintenance or construction sites;
(6) road material sites, sites for the manufacture of road materials, and
access roads to the sites;
(7) the maintenance of an unobstructed view of any portion of a
highway to promote the safety of the traveling public;
(8) the placement of traffic signals, directional signs, and other signs,
fences, curbs, barriers, and obstructions for the convenience of the
traveling public;
(9) the construction and maintenance of storm sewers, sidewalks, and
highway illumination;
(10) the construction and maintenance of livestock highways; and
(11) the construction and maintenance of roadside rest areas adjacent
to or near any highway.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 96; 1991, ch.
137, § 24,27-12-96; renumbered by L. 1998,
ch. 270, § 130,
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as §

» 2-5-103.

27-12-96, and in the introductory paragraph,
made stylistic changes and deleted the first
sentence concerning the manner in which the
department may acquire real property necessary for future state highway purposes,

Acquisition of rights-of-way and other real
property — Title to property acquired.

(1) The department may acquire any real property or interests in real
property necessary for temporary, present, or reasonable future state highway
purposes by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise.
(2) (a) Title to real property acquired by the department or the counties,
cities, and towns by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation,
or otherwise for highway rights-of-way or other highway purposes may be
in fee simple or any lesser estate or interest.
(b) If the highway is a county road, city street under joint title as
provided in Subsection 72-3-104(3), or right-of-way described in Title 72,
Chapter 5, Part 3, Rights-of-way Across Federal Lands Act, title to all
interests in real property less than fee simple held under this section is
held jointly by the state and the county, city, or town holding the interest.
(3) A transfer of land bounded by a highway on a right-of-way for which the
public has only an easement passes the title of the person whose estate is
transferred to the middle of the highway.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 101; 1991, ch.
137, § 29, 27-12-101; renumbered by L.
1998, ch. 270, § 131; 2000, ch. 324, § 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as §

27-12-101, and added new Subsection (1), making related changes in subsection designation.
The 2000 amendment, effective March 16,
2000, added Subsection (2Kb), making a related
change,

72-5-104. Public use constituting dedication — Scope.
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it
has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often years.
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RIGHTS-OF-WAY

72-5-106

(2) The dedication and abandonment creates a right-of-way held by the
state in accordance with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103.
(3) The scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable and necessary
to ensure safe travel according to the facts and circumstances.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 89, 27-12-89;
renumbered by L. 1998, ch. 270, § 132;
2000, ch. 324, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as §
27-12-89.

The 2000 amendment, effective March 16,
2000, substituted "is" for "shall be deemed to
have been" in Subsection (1) and added Subsections (2) and (3).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Evidence.
Generally.
Private rights.
Sufficiency of proof of dedication.
Width of roadway.
Evidence.
Evidence showing, among other things, that
roadway was used continuously for recreational
and agricultural purposes and for access to
other business activities supported the trial
court's ruling that the roadway was dedicated
or abandoned to the public. Kohler v. Martin,
916 R2d 910 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Generally.
Where all three elements under this section
for the establishment of a public highway were
satisfied, the court had no discretion to ignore
that fact and erred in concluding that a road
was not a public highway. Heber City Corp. v.
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997).
Private rights.
Creation of a private right in a public thoroughfare cannot occur; a prescriptive right is in
conflict with the dedication of land to the use of

the general public. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d
910 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Sufficiency of proof of dedication.
Because there were material issues of fact as
to whether people using a road were members
of the general public or landowners in the area,
who had either a private right or permission to
use the road, and there were conflicting statements as to public use of the road for recreational purposes, summary judgment in favor
of the proponents of dedication was erroneous.
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d
1097 (Utah 1995).
Finding that a road was not a public thoroughfare was proper based on evidence that the
road was generally used only during the deer
hunting season and was frequently closed to
the public at other times, and that its use
during the hunting season was by permission of
the owners. Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962
P.2d 806 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Width of roadway.
Generally, the width of a public road is determined according to what is reasonable and
necessary under all the facts and circumstances. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996).

72-5-105. Highways once established continue until abandoned.
All public highways once established shall continue to be highways until
abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction
over any highway, or by other competent authority.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 90, 27-12-90;
renumbered by L* 1998, ch. 270, § 133.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-

ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as §
27-12-90, and made a stylistic change.

72-5-106. Expiration of franchise of toll bridge or road.
If the franchise of any toll bridge or road expires by limitation, forfeiture, or
nonuser it is a free public highway, and no claim shall be valid against the
public for right-of-way or for land or material comprising the bridge or road.

57-1-12

CONVEYANCES
Ed. 1198 (1919), appeal dismissed, 254 U.S.
616, 41 S. Ct. 147, 65 L. Ed. 440 (1920).
_
—Title conveyed.
Under this section, one who conveys coal
lands before he has applied to the government
to purchase the same conveys a good title
thereto. Ketchum Coal Co. v Pleasant Valley
Coal Co., 50 Utah 395, 168 P. 86 (1917).
Where grantor purporting to convey title to
mining claims described them m his deed by

name of claim and survey number, he was
estopped from making any claim to property
described in deed when he subsequently acm r e d t l t l e iheret0m
W a U v# U t a h Copper Co.,
2?? R 55 (8th Cir

1921)

Cited m Barlow Soc'y v. Commercial Sec.
Bank, 723 P2d 398 (Utah 1986); Utah Farm
p ^ Credit Assoc, v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d
994 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am Jur. 2d Deeds
§§ 341, 342.
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 105.
AX.R. — Property insurance, or public li-

ability insurance, as covering, m absence of
express provision, after-acquired premises or
realty, or subsequent additions to described
realty, 18 A L.R 3d 795.

57-1-11. Claimant out of possession may convey.
Any person claiming title to any real estate may, notwithstanding there may
be an adverse possession thereof, sell and convey his interest therein in the
same manner and with the same effect as if he were in the actual possession
thereof.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1980;
C.L. 1917, § 4880; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 78-110.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance §§ 15, 16.

57-1-12. Form of warranty deed — Effect.
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the following form:
WARRANTY DEED
(here insert name), grantor, of
(insert place of
residence), hereby conveys and warrants to
(insert name),
grantee, of
(insert place of residence), for the sum of
dollars, the following described tract
of land in
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this
(month/day/year).
A warranty deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a
conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises
therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights, and privileges
thereunto belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs, and personal
representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the premises; that he has good
right to convey the same; that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs, and
assigns in the quiet possession thereof; that the premises are free from all
encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs, and personal representatives
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57-1-12

REAL ESTATE

will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee, his heirs, and
assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to these covenants may be briefly inserted in the deed following the description of the land.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1981;
C.L. 1917, § 4881; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 78-111; L. 2000, ch. 75, § 20.
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend-

ment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date
line in the waranty deed form and made stylistic changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Actions for breach of warranty.
—Irremediable easement.
Appurtenances.
—Parol evidence.
—Water rights.
Covenant against encumbrances.
—Waiver.
Covenants running with land.
Determination of character of instrument.
"Encumbrances" construed.
Formal requirements.
—Presumptions.
—Signature of witness.
Interest conveyed.
Liability of grantor.
—Materialman's lien.
Limitation of actions.
Vendor's lien.
Way of necessity.
Cited.
Actions for breach of warranty.
Where paramount title is in sovereign, purchaser may yield to that title, and such yielding
constitutes constructive eviction which will
support action on covenant of warranty. East
Canyon Land & Stock Co. v. Davis & Weber
Counties Canal Co., 65 Utah 560, 238 P. 280
(1925).
In an action by a grantee against his grantor
for breach of warranty because in a quiet title
action between the grantor and a third person,
the title was quieted in the third person, the
grantor cannot assert the defense that because
the third party had filed no lis pendens the
grantee was not bound by the earlier decree.
Briggs v. Hess, 122 Utah 559, 252 P.2d 538
(1953).
—Irremediable easement.
In a rescission action for anticipatory repudiation of a real estate contract, summary judgment in buyers' favor was authorized, because
an irremediable easement was not excepted
from the property description in the contract.
Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 R2d 716
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Appurtenances.
On severance of estate by sale of part thereof,

all easements of permanent character that
have been created in favor of land sold, and
which are open and plain to be seen, and are
reasonably necessary for its use and convenient
enjoyment, unless expressly reserved by grantees, pass as appurtenances to land; cement
walk constructed in front of several lots which
was used as easement in connection with use
and occupation of lots passed as an appurtenance to lots on sale thereof. Rollo v. Nelson, 34
Utah 116, 96 P. 263, 26 L.R.A. (n.s.) 315 (1908).
A warranty deed conveys the fee simple title
"together with all the appurtenances, rights
and privileges thereunto belonging," by force of
this section, unless some rights are reserved by
the terms of the conveyance. Accordingly, deed
conveyed prescriptive right to conduct water
through ditch along the right of way without
any mention of such right, because such easement for an appurtenant water right is an
appurtenance to the land. Petrofesa v. Denver
& R.G.W.R.R., 110 Utah 109, 169 P.2d 808
(1946).
—Parol evidence.
Where there was latent ambiguity as to the
existence of a ditch and a right of way as an
appurtenant to the land conveyed by a deed,
parol evidence was admissible. Egelund v.
Fayter, 51 Utah 579, 172 P. 313 (1918).
Where^deed, while conveying appurtenances
as matter of law, was silent as to just what
appurtenances were, latent ambiguity existed
which could be explained by parol testimony.
Wade v. Dorius, 52 Utah 310,173 P. 564 (1918).
Evidence is admissible to establish what was
appurtenant to property under statutory form
of deed, which has effect of passing all appurtenances to property, as not varying terms of
written instrument. Adamson v. Brockbank,
112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947).
—Water rights.
Deed of general warranty of quiet and peaceable possession does not warrant water rights
unless they are appurtenant to land conveyed.
George v. Robison, 23 Utah 79,63 P. 819 (1901).
Covenant against encumbrances.
Where defendant's deed to plaintiffs was in*
the statutory form and excepted from the cov-
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEFENDANTS' CLOSING ARGUMENT
IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

JAMES R. WILHELM and LINDA ROSE
WILHELM,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PINE MEADOWS ESTATES,
INCORPORATED, a Utah corporation;
MILTON R. FARNEY; MARVIN R.
SHAPIRO; ROBERT C. DOLLEY,

i

Case No. 960600032

Judge K. L. Mclff

Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendants Milton R. Farney and Pine Meadows Estates, Inc., a Utah
corporation, (hereinafter "Defendants") and do hereby enter their closing argument in support of
their Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law previously filed. This action was commenced by
Plaintiffs James R. Wilhelm and Linda Rose Wilhelm (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") seeking an order
from the Court requiring Defendants to close a road through Plaintiffs' property, pay damages for
1

V

closure of the road, and pay Plaintiffs attorney fees in prosecuting this action. At the time of the
closing argument, Defendants requested an opportunity to submit its closing argument in writing
because of time commitments later that evening. The Court indicated that it would accept
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and that the Court had already made a determination
that due to the statute of limitations, Plaintiffs were barred from claiming any damages against
Defendants for the repair or cost of closure of the road. During opening statement, Plaintiffs'
Counsel indicated that they were dropping any claim for attorney fees as the same was not
provided because the law suit was between the Grantor, (Defendants), and Grantee, (Plaintiffs).
The only remaining issue to be argued, therefore, was the type of continued use of the road and
whether the road should be deemed as a public road.
The only witness called by Plaintiffs was James R. Wilhelm. Defendants called seven (7)
witnesses including Defendant Milton R. Farney. Two of Defendants' witnesses were the initial
developers who worked intricately with the infrastructure development. The remaining five
witnesses were a forest ranger who has never owned property in the area, the Moyers who were
one of the first persons to purchase property in the area, but who have subsequently sold their
property and no longer resided in the area, and three current property owners familiar with the
road, Mr. Ronald Graham, Stan Grimwald and Buzzy Holts, all of whom still own property in
the subdivision or adjacent subdivisions and who are familiar with the roads because of their
frequent travel of the same. Each of the property owners reside in various parts of the subdivision

and utilized the road for multiple purposes on a frequent basis, not by means of compulsion, but
by pleasure and without the consent of Plaintiffs.
Mr. Pringle, the developer of the subdivision roads who was not named as a Defendant,
was called because of his testimony regarding his frequent use of the road on a daily basis since
the subdivision was developed. Testimony was that he used the road every day and hundreds of
times each summer for ingress and egress and for showing lots to perspective buyers. He further
testified that the road was initially graded to a width of 12-15 feet (big enough for two vehicles
to pass each other) and that the road was definitely roughed in at the time Plaintiff purchased the
lots. Significantly, Mr. Pringle stated that they tried to follow old roads as much as possible to
leave the natural terrain undisturbed. While he could not recall that the road existed in this
particular area, Mr. Farney confirmed that the Wilhelm road was graded in 1965-66 along a preexisting road.
Paul Fullmer, who is the current Cedar Mountain fire chief and prior Dixie National Forest
Ranger, worked in the area for well over 40 years was called because of the following: (1) his
familiarity with the area, (2) his use of the road to access forest land by the government, (3) his
knowledge of use of the road by numerous members of the public as a personal witness to the
same, (4) he was the individual who obtained from his office the 1967 and 1976 photographs and
was familiar with how to read them, (5) his knowledge as to the current necessity of the road, and
(6) an individual who was a disinterested party who had nothing to gain by his testimony. He
testified that he had used the road while working for the forest service and that it was his belief

that the road had been used by logging companies as well as a personal witness to its use by
hunters, strangers, campers and other individuals who were accessing the forest land beyond
Plaintiffs' property. The logging commenced in the early 1960s for only a few years. He further
testified that the road was important and was deemed by the public as a necessary second access
off the mountain in case of fire.
The Moyers were called to testify because they were one of the first people to purchase
property in the area, had lived in the area full time for numerous years during applicable times
of blockage, had utilized the road on a semi-regular basis and had sold their cabin several years
previous, once again, as witnesses with no ulterior motives or personal interest. Each of the
witnesses were familiar with the road and did testify to its existence prior to Wilhelm's purchase
of the property and that no blocking of the road occurred prior to 1993.
At trial, numerous exhibits were presented and stipulated to by both parties. Among these
exhibits, the most probative being areal photographs presented by both the Plaintiffs and
Defendants, ranging from 1960 to 1976, which provided significant support and clarity with
regard to the existence of the road. There can be no doubt that road existed and had been
significantly improved when comparing the 1967 photograph with the 1960 photograph. Even
more compelling than oral testimony is a comparison of the areal photographs from 1967 and 1976
which, when studied side by side, show clearly that the road was obviously present and appears
to be of the same approximate width, extent and nature at the same location. This evidence
clearly shows that a road was there prior to Plaintiffs' purchase of the property in 1968, yet
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Plaintiffs' testimony was adamant that there was no road through the property when he walked
the property on the date he decided to purchase the same. Interestingly enough, Plaintiff James
R. Wilhelm does recall seeing some tracks going through the property but that these tracks had
only bent the grass over and did not appear to be significant. He also testified to a large berm
which no other witness verified and, in fact, disputed. Defendants are left to wonder, after
viewing the evidence, how one could remember minor tracks through the grass and yet fail to
recognize that the a roughed-in road existed of at least 12 feet in width as testified by all of the
witnesses questioned, a fact which Plaintiff denied on rebuttal testimony, even then, after viewing
the photographs and hearing the testimony. Defendants assert that this Court should reconsider
the self-serving testimony of Plaintiff James R. Wilhelm under the circumstance of this irrefutable
testimony which clearly supports the testimony of seven witness against the self-serving testimony
of one witness, the Plaintiff.
Witnesses Moyer and Grimwald both testified that they purchased the property in the 1967
and that they both utilized that road to explore the country, to gather firewood, and for access to
the upper forest area. Neither party saw any blockade until 1993 when Plaintiff stretched a cable
chain across the road to impede travel. Interestingly, the parties were notified of that blockage
and went to look at the same, out of curiosity and surprise. Each wondered how the Plaintiff
could block the road, as they believed it was public road and had been opened to access for well
over 25 years. Stan Grimwald was the water truck driver from the mid 1980's and he never saw
a blockage even though he traveled the road regularly to deliver water.
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Mr. Grimwald, another forest ranger, testified that he traveled the road in 1968 and that
he was on the mountain during all holidays and tried to be there every other weekend. He
indicated that he utilized the road to access the forest property on top of the mountain and had no
doubt that the road existed. He also provided his own professional opinion that a two-track road
existed in the 1960 photograph which could be seen by looking through the spectrograph.
Likewise, Mr. Fullmer testified that, upon looking at the 1960 photos, while he could not be
absolutely certain, he believed that the spectrograph showed the existence of a road over the
Wilhelm property in the 1960s photograph. Both of these individuals had utilized these types of
photographs on a frequent basis through their profession and were accustomed to examination of
this type of evidence. Each could be considered an expert witnesses with regard to examining
these types of photographs as it was a part of their professional work.
Mr. Pringle also presented a very interesting perspective as to his knowledge that the road
had never been blocked prior to 1993. Counsel for Plaintiff, on numerous occasions tried to
contradict and persuade Mr. Pringle to admit that no road existed at the time that Plaintiffs
purchased the property.

It is also interesting to note that as he was being examined by

Defendants' counsel, that he often utilized the "Clinton Defense" by failing to recall the actual
condition of the road in 1967 and from that time forward. However, even under the examination
of both counsel, Mr. Pringle did not waiver on the fact that he lived in the area and that he
utilized that road on a daily basis and, in his own words, hundreds of times each summer and
never observed the road blocked until 1993. This is direct contradiction to testimony by Plaintiff
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which indicated that he had blocked the road in 1973 through 1974, a period indicated somewhere
in the neighborhood of one year. Surely, if Plaintiff had, indeed, blocked the road for a period
of one year, witnesses would have remembered. Furthermore, even Plaintiff admitted that the
intended digging of the line in 1973 and 1974 by GarKane Power was for the purpose of running
the line only and was not intended to block the road. Obviously, if the trenching of the road was
intended to install a power line, then the blocking of the road during that period does not
constitute a blockade sufficient to interrupt the use of the road by the general public.
Furthermore, it is important to notice that none of the witnesses who utilize the road every
summer, many of whom live there during the entire summer, ever witnessed the road blocked
during a year-long period. Obviously, if such had been the case, they would have remembered
the road being blocked in 1973 through 1974, 1980, and 1986 as they all came to view the
blocked road in 1993. Also, how many witnesses must Defendants call to satisfy the coincidences
that all of them missed the blockage each time at the same time. Defendants submit that enough
witnesses have proven that Plaintiffs did not block the road until 1993.
Finally, the testimony of Ronnie Graham lends additional weight to the open existence of
the road until 1993. It is interesting to note that on both 1973 and 1980, certain memorable events
occurred in Mr. Graham's life which lends weight to his knowledge that the road was open during
the years that Plaintiff claims they were blocked. In 1973, Mr. Graham received his first motor
scooter and proceeded to "ride it all over the place" including up and down the Wilhelm road.
Mr. Graham noted that the Wilhelm road was a special attraction because it was steep, fun to ride
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the motorcycle on, and that he rode it on a daily basis and never recalled seeing the road blocked
for any extended period of time. Obviously, in 1973 and 1974, an 18" deep trench would not
block a motor scooter from riding up and down the road and, in fact, might provide an added bit
of fun in jumping over the dirt pile. In 1980, when Plaintiff asserts that he blocked the road for
a period of time with a fallen tree, Mr. Graham testified that he got his XR-125 and that, once
again, he road all over the mountain, including the Wilhelm road, during the entire summer. He
also testified that at that time, while Plaintiffs were there, his sister babysat the Wilhelm children
during the summer and, in fact, he and his parents used the road to travel to the Wilhelm cabin
to check on the children until Plaintiffs' returned at 3:00-4:00 a.m. It seems unreasonable and
obviously would have been an impact upon any party if they had been required to stop because
of the blockade and climb over the same to approach Plaintiffs' cabin in the early hours of the
morning. Likewise, Mr. Pringle would have certainly remembered an inability to travel the road
in 1980 if the same had been blocked by a tree.
In 1986, Plaintiff again claims to have blocked the road with a vehicle. At that time, Mr.
Wilhelm had confrontations with several witnesses regarding the blockage of the road by the car
and, yet, Mr. Wilhelm never called any witness to verify this assertion. Surely, if landowners
in the area were so up in arms that they are "patting their guns" and threatened to move the car
with a tractor, this would have been a memorable experience to any witness. Coincidently, the
two witnesses that he supposedly had these conversations with are now deceased. Furthermore,
when blocking of the road did actually occur in 1993, it did, in fact, create a disturbance of which

everyone was aware. Even those who do not live within the subdivision came to look at the road.
This natural human reaction, without additional testimony, is compelling and clearly convincing
of the fact that had Plaintiff effectively blocked the road prior to that time, it would have been
brought to the attention of everyone and would have been a memorable experience to which all
memories would have been able to draw upon. Interesting enough, the very time that he blocked
the road in 1986 was during the weekend when Plaintiff testified that the "motorcycle races"
occurred and yet no one, including Ron Graham a motorcycle enthusiast, can recall. Would not
people have complained had Plaintiff interrupted their fun?
In summation, the overwhelming testimony of all witnesses called at the time of trial,
including that of Plaintiff, is that in 1973 and 1974, the road was not blocked. The only impact
upon the road was the digging of the trench to install the power line, which did not impede travel
or effectively block the road. The overwhelming testimony regarding any blockage in 1980
concludes that the road was not blocked. Only Plaintiff himself testified that the road was blocked
during this time. The other witnesses testified that it had not been blocked. However, even if the
Court does find that the road was blocked based on Plaintiffs lone testimony, Plaintiff did admit
that the blockage was not effective as the same was immediately removed and he did not further
act to protect the road at that time.
Likewise, in 1986, none of the witnesses recall any car being used to block the road.
However, even if Plaintiff did utilize a vehicle to block the road, Defendants assert that the same
was not effective, in manner or means, as it did not provide adequate notice to those adverse
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possessors who were utilizing the road that the road was intended to be blocked. Numerous
witnesses testified that at various times and in various manners, cars blocked the road for a period
of time. On occasions when these cars blocked the road it was impassible and at other times it
was not. Defendants assert that it was necessary for Plaintiff to utilize some other means of
blocking the road other than placing a car in the middle of the road without further notification
such as a sign or other means to establish that the road was intentionally being blocked to
deliberately prevent travel.
On several occasions, Plaintiffs indicated that they blocked the road on one end of the
property. Obviously, the blocking of that road was on the upper end of the property as a general
rule or by Plaintiffs cabin excepting the alleged blocking of by the car. Witnesses Pringle,
Graham and Farney testified that they were utilizing the road on a daily basis during that time.
Defendants contend that if someone were utilizing a steep, semi-narrow road, and had traveled
up or down the road for a significant distance, roughly a 1,000 feet in length, and then was
required to back up or down the road for almost of the entire distance of the road because it was
blocked, it is highly doubtful that the witnesses would have forgotten this incident. They certainly
didn't forget the 1993 incident which occurred over seven years ago.
Defendants do not dispute that from 1993 to the present, Plaintiff utilized numerous and
varied means of blocking the road. These were all acknowledged and admitted by all of the
parties. They also assert that the blocking caused such a scene, it was brought to the attention of
the other property owners in the subdivision. Defendants concede that this was an effective
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blocking of the road and, from that time forth, Plaintiff effectively blocked the road on various
occasions. This, however, was too little, too late as the road had already been established as a
public road. This is further evidenced by Kane County maintaining the road during the 1990s and
before. If it was not a public road, why did Kane County place signs at the end of the road and
maintain and improve the road to County standards? Why did Sheriff Kitchen issue Plaintiff a
ticket for blocking the road? The answer is obvious, it was and has been for years considered a
public road by all but the Plaintiffs.
The matter presently before the Court has an interesting nuance, which no other trial court
specifically has addressed; being that Plaintiff is the one asserting that the road running through
his property has not been designated as a public road and, therefore, is seeking the Court to
compel Defendants to close the roads. Because Plaintiffs are the moving parties in this matter,
they generally have the burden of proof to show, by preponderance of the evidence, that the road
was not a public road. Plaintiff failed to meet that burden of proof and Defendants clearly and
convincingly have shown that the road has been open to the public for over 30 years. There can
be no doubt that the road was open to the public in that numerous parties, both residing within and
without the subdivision, and including governmental entities utilized, maintained and traveled the
road at their own pleasure and convenience. The testimony was abundantly clear that between
1960 and 1980, the road was never intentionally blocked by Plaintiffs or anyone else. This alone
is sufficient time to establish the ten year minimum for public roads. Because Plaintiffs are the
parties seeking to close the road, as against the entire public and not just Defendants, the fact that

the property was transferred by Defendant Pine Meadows Estates to Plaintiffs does not vitiate
public use of the road prior to the transfer of the Deed, and the testimony was unrebutted that the
road had been utilized by not only property owners but also by hunters, governmental employees,
recreational users, county and federal workers, and the general public. Furthermore, the law was
never intended to prevent a grantor from claiming that a road was open to the public because he
transferred it to the grantee. If the road is open to the public and has been utilized by the public
for a period of ten years, it automatically becomes a public road and, once open to the public,
cannot be reclaimed by virtue of the fact that Grantor transferred the property to another upon
which the public road exists. If this were so, then every road open and utilized by the public
which was thereafter incorporated into a deed transferring the property from grantor to grantee
would limit the public from claiming that the road had already existed. Furthermore, it would be
foolish to prevent a grantor from rectifying his error as the burden then falls upon a third party
to initiate an action to prevent closure of the road. Defendants assert that this would be against
public policy.
While it is admittedly a burden upon the servient estate to have a road traverse through the
property, and while the law does not lightly allow the transfer of property from private to public
use, it is not necessary to prove that the owner of a private road had intended to offer the road to
the public under dedication by use statute, because the owner's intent may be inferred for mere
acquiescence in allowing the public to utilize the road. Draper Citv v. Estate of Bernardo. 888
P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995). Utah Code Ann. §72-5-1041 (1999) states that "a highway shall be
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deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years." This intent may be inferred
from the declarations, acts or circumstances of use by the general public. Gilmore v. Carter. 391
P.2d 426, 428 (Utah 1964). The evidence clearly shows that the road was open to the public and
that the general public was never blocked from utilizing the road from at least 1965 to 1980 and
Defendant argues from 1965 until 1993. Transfer of the property from one to another is irrelevant
with regard to the public road doctrine because the evidence shows that the road has been
continuously used, this Court should find, just as Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d, 910, Utah App.
(1996) that the roadway has been continuously used by the general public for a period greater than
ten years and is, thus, impliedly dedicated to the public as a public highway.
In reviewing the evidence, "continuous use" is crucial in the determination of whether the
road was, is or has become a public road. This Court recognizes that in consideration of both
Crane v. Crane. 683 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1984) and Memott v. Anderson. 642 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982)
the road need not be used in a "regular" or "constant" basis to be continuous but that it must be
utilized as is necessary and is as often as required by the nature of the use and the needs of the
claimants. Even though Plaintiffs erected some barriers from 1993 forward, if the road was
public prior to these barriers being constructed, the barriers do not change the public nature of the
road. Furthermore, in Memmott. that Court took judicial notice as to the purpose for which the
road was originally constructed and in its final determination, relied upon "substantial" evidence
to show that the road had been originally constructed under the protection of federal statute on
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public lands by the ahands of the public". Testimony from a disinterested party indicates that
there was a road access across the disputed area as early as 1966, for forest ranger and other
public purposes and that while the road was subsequently expanded by Defendants in 1967 and
thereafter minimally improved and expanded by Kane County in the late 1980's and early 19901 s,
the road has existed in substantially the same manner in which it exists today for over 20 years.
The evidence also is substantial from both parties that the interruptions by Plaintiffs, if at
all prior to 1993, were minimal and did not substantially interrupt the use of the road. Even if
accepting Plaintiffs testimony, because Plaintiffs did not adequately block the road sufficiently
to warn and disrupt the use of the road, and to give adequate notice to the occupants of the road
prior to 1993, the road must be deemed as a public road. In Thurman v. By ram. 626 P.2d 447,
449 (Utah 1981), the party opposing the road sought to claim that the road was blocked during
the movement of sheep and the Court, by specifically finding that a public road existed, clearly
indicated that the temporary barricades were not sufficient to warrant a disruption to the public.
Furthermore, in reviewing sister jurisdictions, this trial court finds that there must be an actual
interference with claimant's use by means of erecting physical obstacles or otherwise use of the
servient parcel in such a manner as to prevent adverse use.

See Margoline v. Hole/elder, 420

Pa. 544, 546, 218 A2d 227, 228 (1966) (blockade of driveway for two days did not constitute
actual interruption when there was no evidence of attempted use.); Brown v. Ware, 129 Ariz. 249,
251 n.2, 630 P.2d 545,547 n.2 (Ct. App. 1981) (stringing barbed wire across a roadway deemed
insufficient to interrupt usage when barrier was knocked down one day later); South Norwalk

14

Lodge v. Palco Hats, Inc., 140 Conn. 370, 374, 100 A.2d 735, 737 (1953) (claimant repeatedly
removed barriers from right-of-way and continued use); King v. Corsini, 32 111. App. 3d 461,
466, 335 NE.2d 561, 565 (1975) (acts by landowner blocking road for short periods did not
interrupt public use). It is not sufficient to attempt an interruption or to render the use less
convenient. The obstruction must, in fact, interfere with the claimant's usage. See Concerned
Citizens of Brunswick County Taxpayers Ass'n v. State ex rel. Rhodes, 329 NC 37,54,404 SE.2d
677, 687 (1991); Reed v. Piedimonte, 138 AD.2d 937, 937, 526 NYS.2d 273, 274 (1988) (no
evidence that erection of temporary barriers "ever effectively interfered with, or disturbed,
plaintiffs continuous use of the driveway"). Moreover, use of the land by the owner for the same
purpose as the claimant does not constitute any interruption and mere protest by the owner,
whether oral or written, will not interrupt an adverse usage as in Hammond v. Johnson, 66 P.2d
894 (1937), the court stated that:
To interrupt the continuity of the adverse occupant's possessions there must be
a physical interruption of the adverse possession, or a suit or some unequivocal act
of ownership which interrupts the exercise of the right claimed and being enjoyed
by the adverse claimant. 2 C.J.S., Adverse Possession, p. 701, and cases cited.
Such interruption of the adverse claimant's occupancy or user, to stop the running
of the statute, must be of the same definite character as must the adverse claimant's
occupancy or user, to stop the running of the statute, must be of the same definite
character as must the adverse claimant's possession and user be to start the statute
running. The interruption must be open, notorious, and under claim of right such
as to manifest an intention to repossess the property and dispossess the occupant,
and be a challenge to his right and dominion. It must bear on its face an
unequivocal intention to take possession.
To interrupt the continuity of the adverse occupant's possession, there must be a physical
interruption of the adverse possession, or a suit or some unequivocal act of ownership which

interrupts the exercise of the right claimed and being enjoyed by the adverse claimant. 2 C.J.S.
Adverse P. 701, and cases cited. Such interruption of the adverse claimant's occupancy are used
to stop the rendered statute, must be of the same definite character as much the adverse claimant's
occupancy or use which was necessary to start the statute running. The interruption must be open,
notorious, and under claim of right such as to manifest an intent to repossess the property and
dispossess the occupant, and be a challenge to his right and dominion. It must bear on its face an
unequivocal intention to take possession. This type of action simply did not occur based on both
Plaintiffs and Defendant's testimony.
Finally, this Court should find it persuasive that Kane County has treated the disputed road
as a public road. As in, Feldker v. Crook, 567 NE.2d 1115, 1125 (1991) ("maintenance of a road
by public authorities is a strong indication that the road is a public highway, and the converse of
this proposition is a public highway . . ."), this Court finds that the Sheriffs intent to require the
road to remain open, Kane County Road Department's maintenance and upkeep of the road, and
Fire Chief of the Cedar Mountain Fire District assertion that the road is necessary to service the
public, is pursuasive in determining that the disputed road has been abandoned to the public. See
also Wilson v. Seminole Coal, Inc., 336 SE.2d 30, 31 (Wva. 1985) (construing statute to provide
that a public road may be established by public use for statutory period accompanied by some
recognition of such road by public authorities); Idaho Code §40-202 (1993) (requiring that roads
used as highways ashall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the public").

Based upon the foregoing, and the cumulative testimony of numerous witnesses, it is
evident that Plaintiffs never sufficiently provided notice nor interrupted use of the road as a public
road for the purposes stated above until 1993 and that Defendants Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law reflect the determination of this Court and an Order declaring that the road
has been abandoned to the public and an Order reflecting the same is hereby ordered prepared by
the Defendants.
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of March, 2000.
HIGBEE & JENSEN, P.C.

JUStlN W. WXYMENT
Attorney for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

ay of March, 2000, a true and correct copy of the

within and foregoing OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS, PROPOSED MEMORANDUM
DECISION, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR 10-DAY EXTENSION TO FILE PROPOSED MEMORANDUM DECISION
was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to the following:
L. Edward Robbins
Attorney for Plaintiffs
190 W. Center Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
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DISTRICT COURT, KANE COUNTY, UTAH
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (435) 644-2458 Fax: (435) 644-2052

JAMES R. WILHELM and LINDA ROSE
WILHELM,
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 960600032

PINE MEADOWS ESTATES,
INCORPORATED, MILTON R. FARNEY;
MARVIN R. SHAPIRO; ROBERT C.
DOLLEY,

Assigned Judge:

K. L. McIFF

Defendants.

THIS MATTER having come on regularly for trial on February 24,2000 before the
Honorable K. L. Mclff, and Plaintiffs James R. Wilhelm and Linda Rose Wilhelm appearing by
and through their attorney, L. Edward Robbins, and Defendants Milton R. Farney and Pine
Meadows Estates, Inc., appearing by and through their attorneys of record, Justin W. Wayment
and Blaine T. Hofeling. The Court previously granted partial summary judgment, but has been
generous in allowing evidence and has reconsidered all issues and being fully advised in the
premises does hereby adopt the following:

<=>

* &

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, Case number 960600032, Page 2 FINDINGS OF FACT
1-

Defendant, Pine Meadows Estates, Inc. (hereafter Pine Meadows) and plaintiff James R.
Wilhelm entered into a real estate purchase contract on or about June 30, 1968. Under
the contract, plaintiff purchased two lots identified as Lots 38 and 39 in the Strawberry
Valley Estates Subdivision for the amount of $4,390.

2-

Pine Meadows is a closely held corporation with the other defendants being owners,
officers and/or directors thereof.

3-

Lots 38 and 39 purchased by plaintiffs were part of Strawberry Valley Estates, Unit #2
(hereafter "Strawberry") located along the slope of a hill in a mountainous area of Kane
County.

4-

Immediately adjacent to Strawberry and essentially on top of the hill is another group of
lots known as Ponderosa Villa Unit C (hereafter "Ponderosa"). There are other
subdivision units developed by Pine Meadows in the immediate vicinity.

5-

Strawberry was approved by Kane County on Jan. 8, 1968 and recorded on May 10,
1968. Ponderosa was approved by Kane County on Dec. 9,1968 and recorded on Feb.
17,1969.

6-

Several lots in Ponderosa are back to back with Lots 38, 39 and 40 and the adjoining lots
on either side in Strawberry.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, Case number 960600032, Page 3 7-

The plats for Strawberry and Ponderosa are separate and neither reflect how the two plats
fit together.

8-

Prior to recording any of the subdivision plats, and in the area encompassed by the same,
there were several old unimproved one-vehicle-width roads that had been used by
loggers, hunters, ranchers, forestry personnel and others. These old roads are barely
visible on aerial photography dating to the early 1960's and supplied to the Court. The
roads consisted essentially of tire tracks left over a period of time and appear not to
follow a well-thought plan.

9-

One of the old roads crossed portions of Lots 38 and 39, purchased by plaintiffs from
defendant Pine Meadows, and also crossed a corner of Lot 40.

10-

When Pine Meadows recorded its various subdivision plats, it surveyed and engineered
roads to service the various lots, reflecting the roads on the recorded plats and dedicating
them to the use of the public. The platted roads are forty feet (40f) in width, some four
times the width of the old unimproved roads in the area.

11-

In some instances Pine Meadows platted roads which corresponded with some of the old
logger/hunter roads and in some instances roads were platted in areas where no prior road
of any nature had existed.

12-

Only a fraction of the old logger/hunter roads became surveyed and platted roads when
the various subdivision plats were recorded.
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The Strawberry plat did not show a road crossing Lots 38, 39 and 40 but showed only a
road fronting the lots and providing access thereto.

14-

At the time of the purchase, plaintiff James R. Wilhelm and the defendant Pine Meadows,
through its duly authorized agent Bill Pringle, walked over and inspected the two lots.
Pringle was the selling agent in the deal with plaintiffs. Pringle acted as the selling agent
of Pine Meadows for some 100 lots between 1968 and 1990.

15-

The evidence was inconclusive as to when the road across lots 38, 39 and 40 was first
graded. Plaintiffs remembered it was not graded at the time of purchase. Pine Meadows'
president said it was, but its selling agent, Pringle, thought it may not have been. The
initial grading effort was much more narrow and conservative than later occurred.

16-

After contracting to purchase Lots 38 and 39 on June 30, 1968, but before receiving title,
plaintiffs entered upon the property and constructed a cabin.

17-

Plaintiffs accessed their property from the platted road fronting the same. They likely
followed an old logger/hunter road to get to the cabin site, but it was necessary to perform
some earth work to access this old road from the platted road which had been cut along
the mountain slope.

18-

Plaintiffs were issued warranty deeds by Pine Meadows on January 6,1972 for lot 39 and
on September 25,1975 for lot 38.
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The plat covering Ponderosa shows a road running to the rear of Strawberry Lot 38 but it
dead-ends at the boundary between the two plats. The road on the Ponderosa plat is in
the general area, but it is unclear from the evidence whether it is in the exact location of
the road now claimed by defendants.

20-

The Court was furnished something akin to a master plat showing how the various
subdivisions fit together, but this was not an official plat and was never approved nor
recorded. It shows a road running from front to back on Strawberry Lot 38, parallel and
adjacent to the westerly lot line. It is unclear whether this was originally shown on this
unofficial document or drawn in at a later time. In any event, none of the parties claim
the actual existence of a road which corresponds to this depiction, and it is clearly at
variance with the official plat and with the unplatted road in question which cuts
diagonally across three lots.

21-

The warranty deeds issued to plaintiffs do not contain a reservation for roadways and
there is nothing appearing on the Strawberry plat covering Lots 38 and 39 which would
have put plaintiffs on notice of any unplatted road or easement.

22-

Pine Meadows originally conveyed Strawberry Lot 40 to others, but has since reacquired
title and is the current record owner thereof.

23-

During the time that it did not own Lot 40, and under date of Aug. 2,1995, Pine
Meadows obtained an easement across Lot 40 and duly recorded the same on aug. 10,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, Case number 960600032, Page 61995. During this same timeframe,Pine Meadows attempted to obtain an easement from
plaintiffs on Lots 38 and 39, but plaintiffs declined.
24-

Each warranty deed from Pine Meadows to plaintiffs provided only that the conveyance
was "Subject to: covenants, conditions, restrictions, reservations, rights of way and
easements of record" (emphasis added).

25-

None of the defendants have ever obtained or retained an easement of record across
Strawberry Lots 38 and 39.

26-

In conjunction with its platting and subdivision effort, Pine Meadows opened a new road
which was duly platted and constructed and which served and continues to serve
essentially the same purpose as had previously been served by the road which defendants
claim crossed Lots 38, 39 and 40.

27-

Lots 3 8, 39 and 40 each had afrontageof 94.10 feet.

28-

The restrictive covenants governing Strawberry provided that "Lot sizes, as prescribed by
the subdivision plat... are considered minimum lot sizes and no person shall sell, lease
or otherwise dispose of said lot in parcels smaller than the original lot sizes...."

29-

The roadway claimed by defendants cuts diagonally across Lots 38, 39 and 40, comes
within a few feet of plaintiffs' cabin and would, if recognized, substantially reduce the
size of each lot. If a road were cut out of Lot 38 alone, as shown on the unofficial master
plat or sketch, it would reduce Lot 38 by some 43%.
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The Court does not find credible defendants' claim that defendants "inadvertently
neglected" to include the disputed road on the plat or reserve a roadway easement on the
deeds issued to plaintiffs.

31-

The Court makes no finding with respect to whether the route across Lots 38, 39 and 40
is preferable to the newly platted route, nor does it make any finding as to whether or not
two different accesses would be desirable. These are essentially policy issues for the
public body not for the Court to decide.

32-

Kane County approved the various plats, and particularly Strawberry and Ponderosa, with
access as platted and with no reference to the road in question. Any effort by the county
to thereafter create or recognize a public road came less than ten years before plaintiffs
permanently blocked access and did not follow any statutory procedure.

33-

During the 1970fs and into the 1980's the amount of development in the various
subdivision plats in proximity to Lots 38 and 39 was limited, and accordingly the amount
of vehicular traffic in the area was likewise limited.

34-

Also during the 1970fs and into the 1980fs the plaintiff James R. Wilhelm was actively
involved in a professional career outside the state of Utah and along with his wife was
only an infrequent visitor to the cabin they had constructed.

35-

During the 1970fs and into the 1980fs there was some use of the old road across Lots 38,
39 and 40 by others who had constructed cabins in the general vicinity. This use,
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amount of development on the mountain at that time.
36-

During the 1970fs and 1980fs, plaintiff on several occasions undertook efforts to block
access to the road, sometimes with logs, sometimes with vehicles and by reliance upon
trenching undertaken by others and sometimes by personal notice. Some of plaintiffs
blocking efforts resulted in confrontations with would-be users where plaintiffs made
clear their opposition to continued use.

37-

Plaintiffs' blocking efforts were not exhaustive but neither was the amount of use.
Moreover, the use appears essentially to have been made by neighbors within the
subdivisions developed by Pine Meadows as opposed to members of the general public.

38-

By the time the 1990fs arrived, the amount of use had increased and during or about 1993
plaintiffs responded with signs and by installing steel posts in cement with a lock chain
blocking access.

39-

Pine Meadows' agent, Bill Pringle, was somewhat aware of plaintiffs' effort to block
access and use over the years, and had a clear memory of the more permanent and
extensive effort during the 1990fs.

40-

During the 1990fs, the road in question was improved and substantially widened,
presumably by Kane County, though it was not a party to these proceedings. Defendants
did not participate in the expansion and improvement of the road in question.
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The widening and improvement and increased use prompted a much more extensive and
ongoing effort on the part of plaintiffs to disallow access. It is undisputed that this has
occurred at least since 1993.

42-

Plaintiffs' efforts at blocking the road and preventing access met with resistence by
others, including the Kane County Sheriff who cited plaintiff for blocking a public road
sometime during 1996. The action was dismissed in the justice court for lack of evidence
that the road was in fact a public road.

43-

The permanent type devices installed by plaintiffs to block access to the road were
physically removed on more than one occasion. Plaintiffs continued to use the cabin only
for recreation use and were not present when removal occurred.

44-

At no time between the time of contracting to purchase Lots 38 and 39 and the filing of
this law suit was there a ten-year period of uninterrupted use of the disputed road by
members of the public.

45-

Plaintiffs commenced this action on or about October 23, 1996 seeking an order closing
the road, requiring restitution of the land and for attorney's fees. Before trial, plaintiffs
abandoned its request for attorney's fees.

46-

Defendants counterclaimed asking the court to find and decree the existence of a public
thoroughfare across plaintiffs' property.
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When Pine Meadows and its close circle of owners, officers and directors selected among
the old unimproved roads those for inclusion in its formal plats, it necessarily evidenced its intent
to abandon others not so included. The evidence is clear that, for whatever reason, defendants
did not include as a platted road the old logger/hunter road which apparently crossed a portion of
Lots 38, 39 and 40. Rather, defendants platted new roads, one of which serves the same purpose
historically served by the old roadway in question. Kane County accepted the plats with the lots
and dedicated roads as shown thereon. If the County or the defendants required additional access
or intended some other road to be recognized, it should have been shown on the plat. It is
untenable as a matter of law for either defendants or the County to include some old unimproved
roads, elevating them to the status of platted roads, exclude others and then claim those excluded
encumber lots which appear on the face of the plat to be unencumbered. The incongruence of
such a claim is further heightened by the recordation of restrictive covenants which provide that
each lot is at the minimum permissible size and preclude any sale or disposition otherwise.
Moreover, Pine Meadows' conveyance by warranty deed carried with it the statutory guarantee
of "quiet possession" and "that the premises are free from all encumbrances" and that Pine
Meadows would "forever warrant and defend the title... against all lawful claims whatsoever".
UCA §57-1-12. Under the facts of this case, these defendants are precluded from asserting that a
public thoroughfare existed when the plats were recorded in 1968 and 1969 and when the deeds
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establish a pre-existing "public thoroughfare" which the Court concludes it is not.1
Defendants' claim that a public thoroughfare thereafter came into existence is not
supported by the facts. The governing statute, §72-5-104*, provides as follows:
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the
public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often
years.
The law in Utah is well settled that the burden of proof is on the side trying to prove dedication
to the public. Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806 (UT App 1998). This burden can
only be met by proof which is clear and convincing. Ibid. Moreover, there is a presumption in
favor of the property owner and his ownership is accorded a high degree of sanctity. Draper City
v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (UT 1995). It has also been held that use by neighboring
landowners and their personal visitors is not sufficient to prove public use. These persons cannot
be numbered in the class of members of the general public using such road in a fashion that
might ripen into a dedication under the road statute. Petersen v Combe, 438 P.2d 545 (UT 1968).
The use must be such that it is a "thoroughfare" where members of the public have a general
right of passage. Heber City Corp. v Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (UT 1997). Finally, it is generally

1

The Court is mindful of the stringent requirements for a public body to abandon or vacate a dedicated
road or public thoroughfare. How that relates to the county's official acts in this case need not be resolved since the
old unimproved roads (before platting) did not reach the status of public thoroughfares.
2

Before 1998 the statute was found at 27-12-89 UCA.
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public from uninterrupted use destroys the prescriptive right and the 10-year period must begin
anew. Highways §27, 39 AmJur 2d, 1999 at 603.
The evidence laid before the Court by defendants was less than "clear and convincing".
Defendants called several persons that testified of the use over a couple of decades before being
completely blocked out, but for the most part this was use by neighboring lot-owners, or those
who provided services to them; and the absence of extensive development, particularly during
the early years, limited the nature and opportunity for conflict and also reduced the occurrences
where plaintiffs' efforts to blockade coincided with others' efforts to use. But some
confrontations did exist, sufficient to evidence plaintiffs' intent to exclude the public from
uninterrupted use. Furthermore, the blockade devices employed by plaintiffs, including those
that were of a permanent nature during the 1990's, were removed when plaintiffs were not
around.
The County's assertion of a right on behalf of the general public does not appear to have
arisen until near or during the 1990's. This was too little too late and was clearly and strenuously
resisted by plaintiffs beginning in 1993. The County may have been caught off-guard by all of
this proposed development in the late 1960's, but this does not excuse a failure to properly deal
with access issues at the time the plats were approved. The access was as reflected on the
recorded plat, and lot purchasers were entitled to rely thereon. More particularly, lot owners
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unplatted roads later claimed by these defendants and the County in contradiction of the
approved plats. If the County now considers the access inadequate, it can pursue such remedies
as are authorized by law.
All of this adds up to a failure on the part of the defendants to meet their burden of proof.
Furthermore, defendants of all people were not in a position to advance the claim of a public
thoroughfare. Any use by them would have been inconsistent with the continuing obligation of
Pine Meadows under the warranty deeds and would have arisen for the benefit and purposes of
its development and its lot owners and not for the general public. Neither Pine Meadows nor its
officers or directors gained any right from use in violation of the express warranty.
While the Court concludes that a public thoroughfare does not exist, it is unable to
compel defendants to assume the responsibility for obliterating the roadway. There wasn't any
proof that defendants were responsible for its widening and improvement. This renders moot
defendants" argument with respect to the statute of limitations. To the extent the statute of
limitations argument was also intended to apply to the warranties under the deeds, the argument
is rejected. The grantor's duty to "forever warrant and defend" precludes the grantor from
pursuing a course that would create encumbrances inconsistent with the warranty.
Plaintiffs' claims for attorney's fees having been abandoned, the Court does not consider
the same. Plaintiffs' are awarded costs incurred.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, Case number 960600032, Page 14Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to prepare a decree and judgment in conformity with the
findings and conclusions herein entered.
Dated this * 7

day of May, 2000.
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